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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
93.  Baroness Amos raised de‑Ba’athification when she met Ambassador Bremer at the
end of June (see Section 9.2).87 A note of the meeting by her Private Secretary recorded
that Baroness Amos had told Ambassador Bremer that she had:
“… heard some say that this [the de‑Ba’athification process] was biting too deep in
Ministries where large numbers of more senior public servants … might have been
in the top 3 percent of the Ba’ath party, and so removed from post.”88
94.  Mr Sawers’ telegram reporting his impressions of the visit said that Baroness Amos
had told Ambassador Bremer that “the Iraqi women she had met all had horrific stories
of family losses, and had mentioned to her the importance of the [de‑Ba’athification]
policy”.89
95.  Both accounts record Ambassador Bremer’s explanation that the policy was:
“… the most popular decision the Coalition had taken. It had not cut deeply into
ministries … it only applied in effect to Directors General. Virtually all the DGs for
Administration had been given exemptions as they were necessary to administer
public sector pay. There had been others where it was essential to the ministry
and there was an important coalition interest. Bremer felt that the main problem
was that lower level members of the Baath party feared that the policy embraced
them too and that they would be unable to return to public sector jobs. This was not
the case …”90
96.  On 3 July, policy on de‑Ba’athification was raised again in the House of Commons.91
In a debate following an Oral Statement on the humanitarian situation in Iraq, Ms Lynne
Jones asked Mr Hilary Benn, Minister for International Development:
“What action is being taken to distinguish between those Ba’athists who are loyal to
Saddam Hussein and those who joined the Ba’ath party only from expediency, who
do not have a record of corruption and abuse and can, therefore, contribute to the
reconstruction of Iraq?”
97.  Mr Benn replied:
“It is vital that those who played a leading role in the old regime, and all that
flowed from that, should be removed from their positions but, at the same time, the
de‑Ba’athification policy should be sensibly applied because we need to ensure that
services can continue to function. The CPA is extremely conscious of the position
and needs to reflect on it as it takes the process forward.”
87 Telegram IraqRep 56 to FCO London, 26 June 2003, ‘Iraq; Baroness Amos Visit’; Minute Bewes
to Malik, 29 June 2003, ‘Meeting with Paul Bremer’.
88 Minute Bewes to Malik, 29 June 2003, ‘Meeting with Paul Bremer’.
89 Telegram 56 IraqRep to FCO London, 26 June 2003, ‘Iraq; Baroness Amos Visit’.
90 Telegram 56 IraqRep to FCO London, 26 June 2003, ‘Iraq; Baroness Amos Visit’.
91 House of Commons, Official Report, 3 July 2003, column 562.
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