The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
any
remaining SCUD-type missiles with chemical or biological warheads,
“The
Samson
Scenario”; or mount conventional attacks on Israel or
unconventional
attacks on
Israel or UK/US military assets.152
315.
SIS4 also
stated that the outcomes of a bombing campaign would be
“both
uncertain
and hard to control”.
316.
Mr Blair told
the Inquiry that the first paper he had received was the FCO
advice
on
options.153
While it
“concluded there were no anti-terrorist grounds” for
military
action
against Iraq, that was because “we saw no link between Iraq and Al
Qaida”.
It did not
“deal with the point, however, that post September 11th WMD” had
taken
on “a
different significance”. Mr Blair also referred to the details of
Iraq’s capabilities and
its
concealment activities as “not exactly … reassuring”.
317.
Addressing the
papers provided by SIS4, Mr Blair stated that one had
pointed
out that
getting regime change would be “very, very difficult … so watch
out”, and
another had
argued: “On the other hand, leaving him [Saddam] there is also
very, very
difficult.”154
Those two
views remained.
318.
Mr Blair added
that he thought that one of the papers said “by implication
you
cannot stop
the WMD programme unless you actually remove Saddam”.
319.
The papers
produced by SIS4 did not address whether regime change
was
a
prerequisite for stopping Iraq’s WMD programmes. That was the
conclusion of
the JIC
Assessment of 27 February 2002 and the CO Options Paper of 8
March
(see Section
3.2).
320.
On 5 December,
Mr McDonald wrote to Sir Richard Dearlove’s Private
Office
recording
that Mr Straw had seen two SIS papers and thought they were
“very
perceptive”
and he hoped that the Prime Minister would read
them.155
321.
Asked whether
Mr Straw’s comments constituted support for his
proposals,
SIS4
replied:
“No
…
“I don’t
want to leave the impression in your minds that at this point there
was an
autonomous
UK based drive towards regime change, because I have no memory
of
that. I
have a vivid memory of people being very concerned that all this
stuff may be
about to
happen, and what do we think about it. What do we think of the
arguments?
… What are
the dangers? … But clearly we would need to be in a position to
discuss
152
Paper, ‘US
Attacks on Iraq: The Risks and Costs’ attached to Letter PS/C to
Manning, 3 December
2001,
‘Iraq’.
153
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 32-33.
154
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 33-34.
155
Letter
McDonald to [PS/C], 5 December 2001, ‘Iraq’.
366