The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
setting
reconstruction planning within a wider post-conflict
context.
124.
Mr Fernie
advised that the paper would be tabled at a Cabinet Office meeting
the
next day,
when:
“We will
discuss the process for the more comprehensive paper … it will be
useful
to show
to No.10 and the Cabinet Office that DFID is not only the natural
lead on
this
approach but also has the human resources and experience to
dedicate to it.”
125.
Mr Fernie sent
the paper to the Cabinet Office the following day, describing
it
as a
“work-in-progress” paper setting out some “preliminary ideas on
reconstruction
126.
Mr Fernie
stated that the paper benefited from comments offered by FCO,
MOD
and Cabinet
Office officials at a meeting chaired by DFID, which had raised
wider issues
about how
reconstruction fitted with the UK’s overall approach to rebuilding
Iraq and
securing
international consensus behind that approach. DFID’s view was that
the UK
needed to
“start working now on a broader strategy which binds together the
many bits
of work
going on across Whitehall”.
127.
The paper
stated that it was based on the assumption that “an
adequate
international
mandate, agreed by the UN Security Council, will exist for the UK
to play a
full role
in reforming and restructuring Iraq and its
administration”.87
It also
stated that it
was focused
on DFID’s contribution to reconstruction, but had set that within a
“broader
context,
which should be the subject of a further, more overarching UK
Government
strategy
paper”.
128.
While
reconstruction planning needed to be informed by a long-term
perspective of
a country’s
needs, decisions were likely to be taken soon on new governance
structures
and
policies for Iraq, and the international community (in particular
the IFIs, UN and US)
were
already considering what kind of reconstruction support should be
provided. ORHA
was likely
to take decisions within a matter of days which would set the
context for future
reconstruction
planning.
129.
The paper
adopted the (broad) objectives defined in the version of the UK’s
‘Vision
for Iraq
and the Iraqi People’ which had been produced for the 16 March
Azores Summit.
130.
DFID’s “core
focus” in assisting Iraq’s reconstruction would be:
“… the
elimination of poverty, and in particular ensuring the Iraqi
Government was
able to
address its people’s poor health indicators and other social
problems.
After an initial
period of continuing dependence on humanitarian assistance,
Iraq’s
status as a
middle-income country will make it more appropriate for DFID to
support
86
Letter
Fernie to Drummond, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction Planning’,
attaching Paper DFID,
27 March
2003, ‘Iraq – Reconstruction Planning: Objectives and
Approach’.
87
Paper DFID,
27 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Reconstruction Planning: Objectives and
Approach’.
24