5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
786.
The FCO paper,
‘Iraqi Non-Compliance with UNSCR 1441’, was finalised
on
15 March
and published on 17 March (see Section 3.8).336
787.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock consulted colleagues in New York on 16
March
to consider
whether the Security Council could agree an ultimatum
to
Saddam Hussein.
788.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had agreed with his US and Spanish
colleagues
to tell the
press during the following “late morning” that there was no
prospect
of putting
the resolution to a vote, and blaming France.
789.
After the
Azores Summit on 16 March, Sir David Manning spoke to Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
to ask him to phone his Security Council colleagues that evening
to
establish
whether there had been any change in their positions on the draft
resolution.337
790.
Reporting
developments in New York on 16 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
wrote
that,
following the conclusion of the Azores Summit, the UK Mission in
New York had
spoken to
all Security Council colleagues with the message that:
“… there
was now a short time left to consider whether the Council could
agree at
last on an
ultimatum to Saddam which, if he did not fulfil it, would result in
serious
consequences.
If their respective governments were in a position to engage in
such
a
discussion, I would need to hear it as early as possible on 17
March. When asked
(as the
majority did), I said that I had no (no) instructions as to whether
to put the
791.
Sir Jeremy
commented that the French and Russians did not like the
message.
Mr Jean-Marc
de La Sablière, French Permanent Representative to the UN, had
claimed
that the
French had moved significantly over the last two days as President
Chirac’s
interview
would show. The “undecided 6” were “only slightly more
positive”.
792.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that he had agreed with his US and Spanish
counterparts
to tell the
press during the “late morning” of 17 March that there was
“no prospect of
putting our
resolution to the vote, casting heavy blame on the French”. The key
elements
of the
statement should be:
“(a)
the
Azores summit had called for a last effort to see if the Council
could unite
around an
ultimatum;
336
Paper FCO,
15 March 2003, ‘Iraqi Non-Compliance with UNSCR 1141’.
337
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 16 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Summit Meeting in the
Azores: 16 March’.
338
Telegram
452 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Developments on 16 March’.
141