10.3 | Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and stabilisation policy

right approach, bearing in mind the UK was making the case that the conflict was about

WMD and not oil:

“But the pressure from businesses is building and I fear that some of our business

community fear we are not engaged. Some think that the US and France are ahead

of the game already …”

603. Baroness Symons concluded that she felt strongly that the time was right “to be

more on the front foot”.

604. At the end of February, Mr Keith Allan, TPUK Deputy Director International

Group 1, reported to TPUK colleagues that Mr Dominick Chilcott, the Head of the IPU,

had told him that there was scope for a “TPUK slot” in the US Office of Reconstruction

and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).352 The US needed more resources in ORHA

and Mr Chilcott believed that ORHA would welcome someone who could make a

substantive contribution. Mr Chilcott had made it clear that the individual would need to

do “a real job”.

605. Mr Allan commented:

“We see this as a key opportunity for UK plc. As Dominick [Chilcott] said, there

would be no guarantees of contracts, but it would be a clear demonstration of our

commitment to do our best for UK companies.”

606. A junior official in British Trade International (BTI) joined ORHA (then based

in Washington) on 9 March. He subsequently deployed with ORHA to Kuwait and

Baghdad.353

607. On 8 March, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which had responsibility

within the US Government for the reconstruction of the oil sector, awarded a contract

for the repair of Iraq’s oil infrastructure, worth up to US$7bn, to KBR.354 Hard Lessons

reported that the contract was the single largest reconstruction contract in Iraq and the

largest known sole-source contract in US history.

608. Mr Brenton reported on 10 March that “a commercial contact” had passed the

British Embassy Washington a version of a USAID invitation to select US companies to

bid for a US$600m contract for infrastructure reconstruction.355 USAID had confirmed

that it had issued the invitation on 12 February with a closing date of 27 February.

Mr Brenton had pressed for more transparency.

352 Email Allan to Warren, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq: TPUK Position in US Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)’.

353 Email BTI [junior official] to Henderson, 13 June 2003, ‘End of assignment to OCPA and replacement

planning’.

354 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

355 Telegram 320 Washington to FCO London, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq Day After: Infrastructure

Reconstruction Contracts’.

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