9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
257.
Lt Gen Rollo
also reported a conversation with Gen Petraeus in the wake of
the
media
stories:
“Unsurprisingly,
he remains clear that there are a range of tasks based on
a
starred HQ
to be done, albeit at potentially reduced force levels. These
include key
leadership
engagement, training support to ISF, ISTAR [Intelligence,
Surveillance,
Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance] and support for ISOF [Iraqi
Special
Operations
Forces], support for the PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams]
and
in Basra
the consulates, in addition to the provision of an intervention
capability.
At the
tactical level General Odierno intends to formulate his position on
the UK
requirements
post PIC … When it appears this should provide helpful definition
on
what the US
is asking for.”
258.
When
Mr Brown met C (Sir John Scarlett) on 29 August, part of their
discussion
covered
Iraq.117
As a No.10
record of this meeting cannot be found, the Inquiry has
used
a record of
it made by C.
259.
Mr Brown
was reported to be “currently very focused on Basra Palace and
worried
about US
reactions to withdrawal, which he knows is due in the next few
days”. Sir John
and
Mr Brown discussed the potential importance of the negotiation
with JAM1.
260.
At the end of
August, government officials specialising in the Middle East
were
preparing
two separate letters to the FCO on the negotiations and Basra: one
updating
Whitehall
readers not in the MOD chain of command on the latest discussions
with
JAM1 and
focused on the issue of Basra Palace and JAM1’s “guarantee” that
JAM
would not
loot it, and a second “seeking to set the [NAME OF OPERATION] talks
in
context and
to examine the implications of an accommodation with JAM for the
future
261.
The second
letter was intended to explain that “we may still be able to
engineer a
tolerable
(no better) outcome in Basra if we accept the realities of militia
politics”.
262.
On 29 August,
Mr Ahmad al-Shaybani, a senior JAM commander,
announced
that the
activities of JAM would be suspended for six
months.119
The
suspension of
activity,
including against “occupiers”, was to allow some “restructuring”
within JAM. The
following
day, he announced that he had been misquoted and that anti-MNF
activities
were not
suspended. A Cabinet Office official advised Mr Brown that the
cease-fire was
likely to
be an attempt by Muqtada al-Sadr to reassert control over JAM, and
there was a
“high risk”
that some would not respect his call.
263.
Lt Gen Wall
reported to the Iraq Strategy Group on 29 August that there had
been
some
limited militia infiltration and looting of the Warren site
following the handover, with
117
Minute, C’s
meeting with the Prime Minister – 29 August 2007’.
118
Email
government official specialising in the Middle East, 29 August
2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]
Update
Letter 29 August’.
119
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 30 August 2007,
‘Iraq – JAM Ceasefire’.
231