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4.1  |  Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
138.  Sir John Scarlett told the Inquiry that there had been “serious concern” in the
autumn of 2001 about the availability of fissile material “especially from the former Soviet
Union”, but he and Mr Miller both confirmed that there was no specific intelligence about
potential supply to Iraq.70
139.  Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet
Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec) from 2001 to August 2003, told the
Inquiry that his American interlocutors were “very concerned about what was going on in
North Korea”.71
140.  Sir David also told the Inquiry that finds in Afghanistan had refocused attention
on WMD and proliferation. There was pressure to deal with the Libyan programme and
concerns about Iran and AQ Khan (in Pakistan).72
141.  The Butler Review described how, in early 2002:
“For the small group of policy-makers with access to the most sensitive JIC
Assessments, there were increasing concerns about proliferation … It [the JIC]
was also reporting on the evidence found, as a result of military operations in
Afghanistan, of Usama Bin Laden’s efforts to seek unconventional weapons. Finally
senior policy-makers were also pre-occupied with the crisis between India and
Pakistan and the nuclear risks which that posed.”73
142.  The Butler Review concluded that those elements “would have contributed to a
strong sense of what one witness called a ‘creeping tide’ of proliferation and growth
in the nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile capabilities of countries of
concern”.74
Assessment of Iraq’s WMD capability after 9/11
November to December 2001
143.  FCO advice to Mr Straw and No.10 on Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological
warfare programmes in early December was, in some instances, couched in more
definitive terms than the language used by the JIC and omitted the JIC caveats.
144.  Mr Dowse told the Inquiry that, shortly after 9/11, Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign
Secretary, asked about Iraq’s ability to use WMD if it was attacked and that the
assessment provided by the FCO drew on the existing JIC papers.75
70  Private hearing, 5 May 2010, page 49.
71  Public hearing, 30 November 2009, page 4.
72  Private hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 6-7
73  Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph 256.
74  Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph 257.
75  Public hearing, 25 November 2009, page 44.
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