9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
Mr Rycroft
wrote that Mr Blair needed “things that are concrete and
ambitious enough
so that
if/when they happen they really transform the place”.
58.
Mr Chilcott
replied that he could not produce a “serious paper” with the
specific
detail
required:
“To offer
advice on where to build big infrastructure projects … requires a
lot more
knowledge
than we have in the IPU about local conditions … and some sense of
an
overall
development plan for Iraq …
“In my
view, the two most important things the PM should raise with the
President
now are (a)
security and (b) the functioning of the CPA. Until these are
solved, there
is little
chance of any infrastructure work making much
impact.”24
59.
The Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR) met on 5
June,
60.
During the
meeting, officials from the FCO reported that Ambassador Bremer
was
proposing
to create an Interim Administration in July which would provide a
framework of
different
institutions including a Political Council.
61.
The FCO’s view
was that, to strengthen legitimacy, it would be important
that
as wide a
group of Iraqis as possible joined the process and that the UN
Special
Representative
agreed that it was consistent with resolution 1483.
62.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair the same day to report discussion at the
meeting:
“We
[members of the AHMGIR] fully shared your view that an enormous
amount
of work
remains to be done. We were concerned that the US was not
showing
the same
energy, focus and drive in the reconstruction effort that they did
in the
military
campaign.
“Colleagues
also felt strongly that the US must not be allowed to take UK
support
for
granted. Otherwise, as the US ultimately called the shots, we
risked being
caught in a
position of sharing responsibility for events in Iraq without
holding the
corresponding
power to influence them.”26
63.
Mr Straw
attached a list prepared by the IPU of things that would make a
big
difference
to the people of Iraq. He highlighted preventing looting and
criminality,
and turning
the CPA into an efficient, functioning organisation,
adding:
“Unless we
put these two foundation stones in place, reconstruction will
continue
to falter.”
24
Email
Chilcott to Rycroft, 4 June 2003, ‘Draft paper for PM’ attaching
Papers Iraq Policy Unit, 4 June
2003,
‘Projects in Basra’ and ‘Priorities for action on the
reconstruction of Iraq’.
25
Minutes, 5
June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
26
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 5 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Winning the
Peace’.
217