The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The
alternative is that we shape the political context to give us the
best chance of
achieving
genuine mission success. If we believe we want to be able to sign
off in
SE Iraq
with heads held high and job done (i.e. good enough), and I
certainly do,
then we
need to use every means possible to tell the Iraqis that, for the
coalition,
a conditions
based PIC in Basra is non‑negotiable …
“We
probably have but one chance left …”120
185.
ACM Stirrup
visited Iraq from 24 to 26 September, and wrote to Mr Browne
the day
after his
return to give him “an early feel for some of my
conclusions”.121
He
said:
“As briefed
to you, SALAMANCA was a good plan. As eventually agreed by
Maliki
it still is
on the face of it. But even though we have political agreement to
launch
SALAMANCA,
we do not have agreement to tackle the hard issues (such
as
militias) …
I have said all along that success in Basra depends on strong
political
leadership
and engagement: I see no sign of this emerging. So I am not
wildly
optimistic
that SALAMANCA will put us on the road to PIC in
Basra.”
186.
ACM Stirrup
considered that “the proposals for cleaning up individual
police
stations
and culling/retraining the force are good” but would have no
long‑term impact
unless the
“killers” in the Serious Crimes Unit were dealt with. The “key
issue” of militias
remained
unresolved, but ACM Stirrup reported his sense that Prime Minister
Maliki
believed he
could agree a deal that would address the problem.
187.
ACM Stirrup
went on to consider the UK position in Basra after Op
SALAMANCA.
If the
operation was a success, “we would be well on the road to PIC, and
consolidation
at Basra
Air Station to meet our overwatch, mentoring and other long‑term
tasks”.
188.
If Op
SALAMANCA was not a success:
“Returning
to the status quo ante does not at the moment look like a
sensible
choice.
What else is there? Well, we could adopt the Maysan approach,
remove our
tethered
goats from Basra City and force the issue for the Iraqis. So from a
force
structure
perspective the aftermath of SALAMANCA might look pretty much
the
same,
succeed or fail.”
189.
There had been
“no push‑back” on that proposition from the US and UK
officials
and
officers ACM Stirrup had discussed it with whilst in Iraq; the “key
decision point”
would be in
the spring and ACM Stirrup promised “some more detailed thinking
on
this issue”.
190.
At the request
of the Iraq Senior Officials Group, the JIC assessed the
security
situation
in southern Iraq on 27 September, the eve of the start of Op
SINBAD.122
120
Minute
Shirreff, 21 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
21 September 2006’.
121
Minute CDS
to SofS [MOD], 27 September 2006, ‘CDS visit to Iraq 24‑26 Sep
06’.
122
JIC
Assessment, 27 September 2006, ‘Iraq: The Security Situation in the
South’.
38