The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
contains the Inquiry’s analysis, conclusions and lessons in
relation to the
deployment
of civilian personnel in Iraq, the evidence for which is set out in
Section 15.1.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
the
recruitment, deployment or impact of UK police officers in Iraq,
addressed in
Section
12;
•
whether
sufficient civilian personnel were deployed to achieve the
UK’s
objectives
in Iraq, or the contribution that civilian personnel made to
Iraq’s
reconstruction,
both addressed in Section 10;
•
the funding
of civilian deployments, including the cost of protective
security
measures,
addressed in Section 13; or
•
the
Government’s reviews of the UK approach to post-conflict
reconstruction and
stabilisation,
and the creation of a deployable UK civilian stand-by
capability,
addressed
in Sections 10.3 and 10.4.
•
Before the
invasion of Iraq, the Government had made only minimal preparations
for
the
deployment of civilian personnel.
•
There was an
enduring gap between the Government’s civilian capacity and the
level
of its
ambition in Iraq.
•
There was no
overarching consideration by the Government of the extent to
which
civilians
could be effective in a highly insecure environment, or of the
security assets
needed for
civilians to do their jobs effectively.
•
The evidence
seen by the Inquiry indicates that the Government recognised its
duty
of care to
UK-based and locally engaged civilians in Iraq. A significant
effort was
made to
keep civilians safe in a dangerous environment.
3.
Between 2003
and 2009, UK and Iraqi civilian personnel made an
essential
contribution
to the UK’s efforts to help rebuild Iraq. They often did so in
extremely
dangerous
circumstances. Some locally engaged (LE) staff and UK-based
contractors
lost their
lives.
4.
The initial
deployment of only a handful of civilian personnel reflected
pre-invasion
assumptions
about the limited extent of the likely UK contribution to the
post-conflict
reconstruction
and administration of Iraq.
5.
Soon after the
invasion, Mr Blair called for a significant increase in the UK
civilian
effort.
Further calls to strengthen the UK civilian presence in Iraq
followed.
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