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6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003
up whatever government emerges until it establishes its own authority against a
background where such occupation would inevitably soon become unpopular.”274
496.  The Earl of Onslow (Conservative) called on the Government to plan for the worst.
If force were used and the Iraqi Government collapsed, “what is the worst-case scenario,
are we thinking about it and do we know what to do?”275
Initial analysis of the issues and the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq
497.  From 20 September 2002, the Cabinet Office-chaired Ad Hoc Group on Iraq
(AHGI) co-ordinated all non-military cross-government work on post-conflict
issues.
498.  The AHGI was not tasked to consider in detail the operational requirements
for humanitarian relief or wider reconstruction.
499.  Nor was it required to examine systematically the different policy options
for post-conflict Iraq, the UK’s potential involvement in different scenarios or the
associated risks.
500.  The focus of the AHGI’s work during autumn 2002 was a series of analytical
papers by the FCO and other departments on the post-conflict administration and
reconstruction of Iraq, and the possible consequences of conflict for the UK.
501.  There was some visibility between military and civilian post-conflict analysis,
but the two strands of work remained largely separate until the creation of the IPU
in February 2003 (see Section 6.5). None of the analytical material produced by the
AHGI in 2002 was put to Ministers for decision.
502.  The AHGI was chaired by Mr Bowen and overseen by Sir David Manning.
Its work was not shown routinely to Mr Blair.
503.  The AHGI held its first meeting on 20 September.276
504.  Mr Drummond wrote to Mr Bowen beforehand, suggesting topics for discussion
and proposing departmental responsibilities for different subjects:
“In the absence of initiatives from the centre, a few departments have done their
own work on the consequences of action in Iraq. We need to find out what has
already been done and encourage departments to share it. So far I have only seen
an FCO note on unintended consequences … This identifies them but stops short
274  House of Lords, Official Report, 24 September 2002, column 916.
275  House of Lords, Official Report, 24 September 2002, column 1002.
276  Minute Drummond to Manning, 23 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
195
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