6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
up whatever
government emerges until it establishes its own authority against
a
background
where such occupation would inevitably soon become
unpopular.”274
496.
The Earl of
Onslow (Conservative) called on the Government to plan for the
worst.
If force
were used and the Iraqi Government collapsed, “what is the
worst-case scenario,
are we
thinking about it and do we know what to do?”275
497.
From 20
September 2002, the Cabinet Office-chaired Ad Hoc Group on
Iraq
(AHGI)
co-ordinated all non-military cross-government work on
post-conflict
issues.
498.
The AHGI
was not tasked to consider in detail the operational
requirements
for
humanitarian relief or wider reconstruction.
499.
Nor was it
required to examine systematically the different policy
options
for
post-conflict Iraq, the UK’s potential involvement in different
scenarios or the
associated
risks.
500.
The focus
of the AHGI’s work during autumn 2002 was a series of
analytical
papers by
the FCO and other departments on the post-conflict administration
and
reconstruction
of Iraq, and the possible consequences of conflict for the
UK.
501.
There was
some visibility between military and civilian post-conflict
analysis,
but the two
strands of work remained largely separate until the creation of the
IPU
in February
2003 (see Section 6.5). None of the analytical material produced by
the
AHGI in
2002 was put to Ministers for decision.
502.
The AHGI
was chaired by Mr Bowen and overseen by Sir David
Manning.
Its work
was not shown routinely to Mr Blair.
503.
The AHGI held
its first meeting on 20 September.276
504.
Mr Drummond
wrote to Mr Bowen beforehand, suggesting topics for
discussion
and
proposing departmental responsibilities for different
subjects:
“In the
absence of initiatives from the centre, a few departments have done
their
own work on
the consequences of action in Iraq. We need to find out what
has
already
been done and encourage departments to share it. So far I have only
seen
an FCO note
on unintended consequences … This identifies them but stops
short
274
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 916.
275
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 1002.
276
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 23 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on
Iraq’.
195