9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
656.
Mr Patey
and Mr Sawers, who was visiting Baghdad, were therefore
conducting an
“immediate
and intensive” round of talks with those Iraqi politicians
“committed to getting
a
replacement to Ja’afari” to encourage them to say that they would
not support him in a
Parliamentary
vote.
657.
Mr Patey
judged that:
“We will
need to press the parties to reach clear agreement on who they will
support
if Ja’afari
is removed to avoid another uncomfortably close or split vote
rather than
the broad
cross-party consensus necessary to give a new government of
national
unity the
strongest possible start in the circumstances.”
658.
Mr Patey
also commented:
“… in the
long run we needed to get away from reliance on sectarian based
parties
and to
reach out to moderates from all communities”.
659.
On 5 April,
the JIC reviewed sectarianism in Iraq.316
660.
The JIC judged
that ethnic and sectarian rivalries had been a feature of
Iraqi
society
since the foundation of the state and had been exacerbated by
Saddam
Hussein’s
predominantly Sunni regime. Since his removal in 2003, tensions
had
resurfaced.
661.
The JIC judged
that:
“I.
Sectarian violence in Iraq has been increasing since mid-2005: it
has intensified
in the
aftermath of the Samarra mosque bombing. Much of the violence
is
concentrated
among the mixed populations of Baghdad and its satellite
towns.
Thousands
of people – both Sunni and Shia – have been displaced.
“II.
Al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaida in Iraq (AQ-I) initiated the anti-Shia
campaign, exploiting
existing
deep-seated tensions. Although AQ-I remains dominant, some
Sunni
Arab
nationalist insurgents are also carrying out sectarian attacks, in
response to
ordinary Sunnis’
resentment of what they see as a Shia-dominated
government
backed by
Iran.
“III. The
public Shia response to the increasing sectarian violence has
been
restrained.
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani remains an important moderating
figure.
But Shia
patience may be wearing thin. Further attacks on Shia shrines or
leading
political
and spiritual leaders, are likely, and will severely test Shia
resolve.
“IV. The
greatest potential for large-scale street disorder aimed at Sunnis
comes
from
Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, particularly in
Baghdad where
they are in
de facto control in parts of Sadr City. But the most disciplined
anti-Sunni
campaign is
being run by the SCIRI party’s paramilitary Badr organisation,
which
316
JIC
Assessment, 5 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Sectarianism’.
597