3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
637.
Advising on
the perspective from Washington, Mr Brenton reported that
President
Bush
was:
“… utterly
determined to get Saddam out. In retrospect it looks as if he
finally and
firmly
reached that conclusion in early December at the time of the false
Iraqi
declaration.
The entire subsequent action has been driven by it. This is a
President
who sets
targets and expects his subordinates to deliver. Hence the
ironclad
determination
of the timetable (which has hardly budged in three months) and
the
occasionally
visible uneasiness about focusing exclusively on disarmament
and
sticking to
the UN route (in case we got the answer ‘yes’). This does not mean
that
Bush wants
to go to war, but the bottom line is that Saddam must
go.”218
638.
Mr Brenton
added that President Bush “had every reason to feel confident”
about
military
action:
“The chief
current nightmare in the Pentagon and intelligence community
is
‘catastrophic
success’ – a collapse of resistance in Iraq which moves too fast
for us
instantly
to establish order in its wake. Of course nothing is certain and
there are
downside
scenarios … But the high probability projection is for a quick and
relatively
clean
victory.
“As you
know, the US are ready to start the (short) countdown to military
action
next week.”
639.
President Bush
also had domestic political grounds for confidence as
the
conviction
that war is inevitable “had taken hold”. Liberal politicians had
“kept their heads
down”, and
conservative commentators had “grown increasingly impatient with
the
UN’s delays”.
640.
Mr Brenton
wrote that the US Administration had, however, “been shocked” at
their
“inability”
to get Turkey on board and the “failure, despite what they see as
vigorous
arm
twisting, to get a majority for a second … resolution”. The State
Department was
“concerned
at images of US unilateralism” and was:
“… working
hard at giving the ‘coalition’ of supportive countries a more
visible
presence.
In this optic, the steadfastness of UK support, bringing with it
other
key players
… had been invaluable to them. The President is thus
concerned
about the
Prime Minister’s present political difficulties not only out of
fellow feeling
(… a genuinely
significant factor …) but also out of self interest. It would
be
massively
damaging for US interests for the British Government to fall
because of
our support
in Iraq. The US will go to great lengths to help it not happen (as
indeed
they have
started to do with their announcement on the Road
Map).”
218
Telegram
350 Washington to FCO London, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq’.
509