3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
“The strain
on everyone around me was almost unbearable …
“Gradually
I did deal with it. I sat and reasoned it all through. I knew in
the final
analysis I
would be with the US, because it was right morally and
strategically.
But we
should make a last ditch attempt for a peaceful solution. First to
make
the moral
case for removing Saddam … Second, to try one more time to
reunite
the
international community behind a clear base for action in the event
of a
continuing breach.”
879.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had telephoned him at 7:45am on 3
March
and was:
“… even
more worried than he had been on Friday. He felt things were just
not
where they
needed to be. David M[anning] and John Scarlett came back from
their
weekend
trip … both countries were very firmly on the fence and could see
no
reason to
come off it. TB said it was still possible we could get a majority
on the
UNSC but if
it was in circumstances where people felt we bullied and
arm-twisted,
the French
would be less worried about putting down a veto. The Americans
were
frankly
alienating people by their tactics. David M said the message these
smaller
countries
got was the basic assumption from the Americans that they would
come
over in the
end.
“I said …
that our problem on the communications front was largely
caused
by US friendly
fire … They looked the whole time like they were desperate
for
war. We
at least didn’t look like we were desperate for war, but we did
look like
we were
desperate to be with them … TB said he would have to tell Bush that
it
was not
possible to get the votes at the moment. It was totally what they
didn’t
want to
hear but they had to hear it from someone. He was very down on
the
Americans …
I sensed they were becoming irritated with us
…”273
880.
Mr Campbell
added that the destruction of missiles had “tipped the
balance”
of public
opinion “towards giving the inspectors more time”. Mr Blair
was “moving
to the
Canadian position of a bit more time to get the questions finally
answered”.
881.
Mr Straw
proposed an offer of safety and immunity if Saddam Hussein
would
go into
exile and returned to the earlier idea of setting out publicly some
key
benchmarks
against which Iraq’s “full and active” compliance could be
judged.
882.
Mr Straw
spoke twice to Secretary Powell on 2 March to discuss
progress
in securing
support for the UK/US/Spanish draft resolution and possible
ideas
for
addressing the concerns that had been raised by other members of
the
273
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
274
Letter
Straw to Manning, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversations with Colin
Powell, 2 March’.
339