The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

30. Lt Gen Fry assumed that “some form of enduring commitment … will be required”.

31. On the same day Dr Condoleezza Rice, the US National Security Advisor, told

Sir Nigel Sheinwald, who was visiting Washington, that President Bush was of the view

that the only way to honour those who had died in Iraq was to get the job done.16 There

would be no reduction of US troops unless the security situation permitted it.

32. On 21 July, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) issued an Assessment of the

security situation in Iraq.17

33. The JIC recorded that, across Iraq, there was a brief reduction in violence

immediately after the IIG assumed authority on 28 June, but “attacks are still occurring

at a steady rate that is impeding progress on the international community’s political and

economic objectives for Iraq”.

34. Of those attacks:

“Most … continue to be against the MNF, using small arms, improvised explosive

devices (IEDs), mortars and rockets. But suicide car bomb attacks, principally

targeting Iraqis, have also continued. Islamist groups, and others, continue to take

(and kill) hostages … Attacks against infrastructure continue.”

35. Although the situation in Najaf, Karbala and the Shia areas of Baghdad remained

“relatively calm”, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) “in effect retains control of the Imam Ali

shrine in Najaf”. Muqtada al-Sadr was maintaining a “low profile” and was assessed

to be “seeking a political role, while retaining military options”.

36. The JIC judged that:

“No significant reduction [in the level of violence] is likely in the near term and a

number of triggers during the next few months may result in increased violence.”

37. Lieutenant General William Rollo told the Inquiry that, when he arrived to take over

as GOC MND(SE) in July 2004, the situation in the South of Iraq was “basically quiet”.18

38. The Annotated Agenda for the AHMGIR on 22 July said that “there have been a

number of high profile incidents in recent days … reflecting the continued capacity of

insurgents to plan and carry out attacks”.19

39. In a single week in mid-July, the Governor of Mosul, a leading member of the

Basra Provincial Council, the Babil Chief of Police and one of the Iraqi MOD’s Directors

General were killed in separate incidents, along with several members of the Iraqi

Security Forces and civilians. The Iraqi Minister of Justice was also attacked.

16 Letter Rycroft to Adams, 18 July 2004, ‘Nigel Sheinwald’s visit to Washington’.

17 JIC Assessment, 21 July 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.

18 Public hearing, 15 December 2009, page 4.

19 Annotated Agenda, 22 July 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

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