The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
So he had
strategic intent and capability on WMD; and an active programme
on
ballistic
missiles.
“Such an
explanation would mean that some of the intelligence upon which we
acted
was wrong;
but that nonetheless the threat was there, as was the breach of
UN
resolutions.
It would also explain why the picture was so confused and why,
whilst
the exact
basis of action was not as we thought, the action was still
justified.”
811.
Mr Blair’s
“hunch” was that the Butler Review would reach similar
conclusions.
Both Lord
Butler and the Senate Intelligence Committee were “bound to be
critical …
in certain
respects”. But the US and UK had “to avoid the absurd notion that
therefore
there was
no threat at all, as if 12 years of history and UN resolutions
never existed”.
812.
Mr Blair
suggested that, if Mr Duelfer were thinking along those lines,
it made
sense
urgently to investigate the possibility of publishing the ISG
report at the same
time as the
Senate and Butler Reports. That would “provide the clear evidential
basis for
saying
there was indeed a threat, even if it was not the threat that had
been anticipated”.
“It may be
impossible but if at all possible we should have this issue dealt
with and
lanced all
at the same time.”
814.
During a video
conference with President Bush on 22 June, Mr Blair said
that
Mr Duelfer
seemed to be planning to publish in August. That was up to him, but
with
other WMD
reports due to be published earlier, it might make sense to bring
the
815.
Reporting on a
meeting in London on 2 July, Mr Landsman wrote that
Mr Duelfer
had been
insistent that there was still plenty for ISG to do and that he had
“repeatedly
mentioned
CW/terrorism”.455
816.
Mr Duelfer
was reported to have said:
•
The timing
for his next report “could slip a little”.
•
There was
“potentially a good story to tell on the Saddam regime
strategic
intent”,
but he was “unhappy about the quality of the drafting produced
in
the ISG”.
•
He “wanted
to use his report to challenge assumptions”.
•
Saddam
Hussein’s regime was “highly arbitrary and personalised: we should
not
expect to
find carefully set out plans and consultation
exercises”.
•
He “hoped
to be able to point to a ‘sharp breakout capability’”.
454
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 22 June 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
Bush, 22 June: Iraq’.
455
Minute
Landsman to FCO [junior official], 5 July 2004, ‘Iraq WMD:
Meeting with Duelfer, 2 Jul’.
582