3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
50.
Secretary
Powell also stated that human sources had told the US
that:
•
The Iraqis
were moving “not just documents and hard drives but also
weapons
of mass
destruction to keep them from being found by
inspectors”.
•
“In early
December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists warned of
the
serious
consequences that they and their families would face if they
revealed
any
sensitive information to the inspectors. They were forced to sign
documents
acknowledging
that divulging information is punishable by death.”
“Saddam
Hussein also said that scientists should be told not to agree to
leave
Iraq.
Anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated
as
a spy.”
•
A “false
death certificate” had been issued for one scientist, and he was
sent into
hiding, and
a “dozen experts have been placed under house arrest … at one
of
Saddam
Hussein’s ‘guest houses’.”
51.
Secretary
Powell added that the “information and intelligence” pointed to “an
active
and
systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep materials
and people from
the
inspectors”.
52.
Secretary
Powell stated that Iraq had failed the test of providing an
honest
declaration
and the conclusion that Iraq was now in further material breach of
its
obligation
was “irrefutable and undeniable”. Iraq had “placed itself in danger
of the
serious
consequences called for in resolution 1441”. The Council placed
itself “in danger
of
irrelevance” if it allowed “Iraq to continue to defy its will
without responding effectively
and
immediately”.
53.
Secretary
Powell set out the “real and present dangers” posed by Iraq’s
WMD,
in particular
its ability using mobile production facilities to produce
biological agent
and its
ability to disperse biological agents “indiscriminately” (see
Section 4.3).
Secretary Powell
also described intelligence and information on Iraq’s
chemical
weapons,
nuclear weapons and long range missile programmes.
54.
Secretary
Powell concluded by setting out the US position on the activities
in Iraq
of Al
Qaida and Ansar al-Islam. Iraq’s denial of those links and its
support for terrorism
was “a web
of lies”. The US was not prepared to run the risk of Saddam Hussein
using
his weapons
of mass destruction.
55.
Secretary
Powell said that Iraq was not taking its last chance and the
Council had
an
obligation to ensure that its resolutions were complied
with.
56.
During his
presentation, Secretary Powell also drew attention “to the fine
paper
that the
United Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in exquisite
detail Iraqi
deception
activities”.
57.
Secretary
Powell was referring to the No.10 document, ‘Iraq – Its
Infrastructure
of Concealment,
Deception and Intimidation’, which is addressed in Section
4.3.
189