Executive
Summary
•
The MOD
made only a broad estimate of direct civilian casualties arising
from
an attack
on Iraq, based on previous operations.
•
With
hindsight, greater efforts should have been made in the
post‑conflict
period to
determine the number of civilian casualties and the broader effects
of
military
operations on civilians. More time was devoted to the question of
which
department
should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties
than it
was to
efforts to determine the actual number.
•
The
Government’s consideration of the issue of Iraqi civilian
casualties was
driven by
its concern to rebut accusations that Coalition Forces were
responsible
for the
deaths of large numbers of civilians, and to sustain domestic
support for
operations
in Iraq.
825.
In a number of
Sections of this Report, the Inquiry has set out explicit
lessons.
They relate
in particular to those elements of the UK’s engagement in Iraq
which might
be
replicated in future operations.
826.
The decision
to join the US‑led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the product of
a
particular
set of circumstances which are unlikely to be repeated. Unlike
other instances
in which
military force has been used, the invasion was not prompted by the
aggression
of another
country or an unfolding humanitarian disaster. The lessons drawn by
the
Inquiry on
the pre‑conflict element of this Report are therefore largely
context‑specific
and
embedded in its conclusions. Lessons on collective Ministerial
decision‑making,
where the
principles identified are enduring ones, are an exception. They,
and other
lessons
which have general application, are set out below.
827.
In a
democratic system, public support and understanding for a major
military
operation
are essential. It is therefore important to guard against
overstating what
military
action might achieve and against any tendency to play down the
risks. A realistic
assessment
of the possibilities and limitations of armed force, and of the
challenges of
intervening
in the affairs of other States, should help any future UK
Government manage
expectations,
including its own.
828.
When the
potential for military action arises, the Government should
not
commit to a
firm political objective before it is clear that it can be
achieved. Regular
reassessment
is essential, to ensure that the assumptions upon which policy is
being
made and
implemented remain correct.
829.
Once an issue
becomes a matter for the Security Council, the UK
Government
cannot
expect to retain control of how it is to be discussed and
eventually decided
unless it
is able to work with the interests and agendas of other Member
States.
In relation
to Iraq, the independent role of the inspectors was a further
dimension.
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