9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
143.
Mr Blair and
Prime Minister Allawi met in London on 19
September.68
144.
Prime Minister
Allawi said that tackling the security situation was his top
priority,
but he
lacked effective resources to do it: he needed two mechanised
divisions, a rapid
deployment
force, an effective anti-terrorist capability in the police and a
more rapid build
up of
intelligence capability.
145.
Security was
Prime Minister Allawi’s personal focus, but was part of wider work
on
an overall
strategy addressing national reconciliation and Sunni outreach,
building the
economy and
building up the institutions of government and the
state.
146.
Mr Blair
confirmed the offer of staff from No.10 to provide practical
support to
Prime Minister
Allawi in setting up his office. The two men agreed that they
needed
to develop
a channel that would enable them to ensure the reform programme
was
implemented.
Mr Blair would need to know Prime Minister Allawi’s priorities week
by week,
for
discussion in the UK system and with the Americans. Mr Blair
observed that “contact
with
President Bush was essential in order to get pressure from the top
in Washington”.
147.
Following the
meeting, Sir Nigel Sheinwald commissioned advice from Lt
Gen
McColl on
how best to meet Prime Minister Allawi’s urgent requirement for
mechanised
forces, a
rapid deployment capability, counter-terrorist police and
intelligence.
148.
In response to
the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group’s 16 September
commissions,
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary provided two papers on 20 September: one on the
current
status of
the ISF (including the Petraeus Plan and recommendations for
further work)
and a
speaking note for the conversation with President
Bush.69
These are
described
in detail
in Section 12.1.
149.
Mr Straw wrote
to Mr Blair to answer the third commission.70
He advised
that:
“To succeed
in the elections Allawi needs to decide on his coalition; agree a
vision
and sell it
in all parts of the country; and form a campaign apparatus straight
away.”
150.
Mr Jim
Drummond, DFID Director, Iraq, wrote to Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary
on 23
September enclosing “a few points to make on reconstruction” for
the video
conference.71
That advice
is described in Section 10.2.
151.
On 23
September, Lt Gen McColl sent Lt Gen Fry a paper on the UK’s
options for
withdrawing
or reducing the number of troops in Iraq “up to and beyond January
2006”.72
68
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 19 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
meeting with Prime Minister
Allawi,
Sunday 19 September’.
69
Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 20 September 2004, ‘Advice for the Prime
Minister’s next VTC with
President
Bush’.
70
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 20 September 2004, ‘Allawi’s Political
Strategy’.
71
Letter
Drummond to Quarrey, 23 September 2004, ‘VTC with President
Bush’.
72
Minute
McColl to DCDS(C), 23 September 2004, Iraq up to and beyond January
2006 – defining
a UK position’.
419