The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
economic
concerns”. Neutrality was “probably the best we could expect from
the region”
and the US
was likely to “restrain Israel from taking part in military
action”.
266.
Real
progress towards a Palestinian state would reduce Arab antipathy
to
military
action.
267.
Real progress
towards a Palestinian state would reduce Arab antipathy to
military
action.
Both the UK
and the US were pursuing some initiatives aimed at
progress
towards a
viable Palestinian state, but “another upsurge of
Palestinian/Israeli violence”
was “highly
likely” and Saddam Hussein “would use continuing violence to
bolster
popular
Arab support for his regime”.
268.
There would
be a need to address whether the benefits of military
action
would
outweigh the risks.
269.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated that the UK would need to ensure that
the
benefits of
military action outweighed the risks. It stated that a “post-war
occupation of
Iraq could
lead to a protracted and costly nation building exercise” and that
US military
plans were
“virtually silent” on that point. Washington could look to the UK
to “share
a
disproportionate share of the burden”. Further work was required on
what form of
government
might replace Saddam Hussein’s regime and the timescale which
would
be required
to identify a successor.
270.
The UK would
also need to consider “in greater detail” the impact of military
action
on the UK’s
other interests in the region.
271.
The planning
and preparation for a post-conflict Iraq are addressed in Section
6.4.
272.
An
information campaign would be required to persuade opinion in the
UK
and
overseas that it was necessary to take military
action.
273.
The Cabinet
Office paper identified the need for:
•
time “to
prepare public opinion in the UK that it was necessary to take
military
action”;
and
•
a
“substantial effort to secure support of Parliament”.
274.
Closely
related domestic and overseas information campaigns would be
needed
giving
“full coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his
WMD and the
legal
justification for action”. The overseas information campaign would
be “designed to
influence
Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World and the wider international
community”.
275.
The Cabinet
Office paper was written in order to support a
Ministerial
discussion
about the approach the UK should take to the US on Iraq. It
identified
the issues
the UK should be trying to get the US to address before embarking
on
military
action to secure regime change in Iraq in a way the UK would find
difficult
to
support.
48