The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
613.
In relation to
statements in Chapter 3 of the dossier, the minute
stated:
•
Paragraph
1, first bullet: the “statement about ‘recent production of
chemical
[and
biological] agents’” could not “be supported” by the intelligence
available
to the
author.
•
Paragraph
5, first bullet: the author believed that the statement that
“Intelligence
shows that
Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of
chemical
[and
biological] weapons” was “far too strong” and “in contrast to
other
statements
in this paragraph which use the term ‘intelligence indicates
that’
which is
more balanced”.
•
Paragraph
8, first bullet: the intelligence available to the author warranted
a
statement
“no stronger” than “Iraq has probably continued to produce
chemical
agent”, not
the statement that “Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued
to
produce
chemical agent.”
614.
The minute was
copied to Mr Cragg’s office and to Dr Jones.
615.
Dr Jones told
Lord Hutton that the “problems” with the 45 minutes report
of
30 August
“fell into three categories”. The information was “second-hand”; it
“did not
differentiate
between … chemical … or … biological weapons”; and there was “a
lack
of collateral
intelligence”.334
616.
Dr Jones
explained that the circumstances in which it would be important to
deliver
biological
weapons within 45 minutes “would be fairly special circumstances”
and that
“had pushed
us into thinking perhaps we were talking about chemical weapons”.
It was
“easy” to
put chemical and biological weapons:
“… together
in a collective term … But there was an element of doubt coming
into
our
analysis … We would have looked, normally, for further definitions
to feel really
comfortable
…”
617.
Dr Jones also
stated that they had been “worried” by the absence of
evidence
relating to
the production of chemical agents and that:
“We had not
seen the weapons being produced. We had no evidence of any
recent
testing or
field trials … So that all cast some doubts in our mind on that
particular
piece of
intelligence.”
618.
Dr Jones told
Lord Hutton that he thought the intelligence was “important” but
the
references
in the draft dossier were “too strong”. It was:
“…
reasonable to say that the intelligence indicated that this was the
case … but …
we did not
think the intelligence showed it absolutely beyond any shadow of
doubt.”
334
The
National Archives, 28 January 2004, Report of
the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding
the Death
of Dr David Kelly [“The Hutton
Report”], paragraph 190.
232