6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
604.
The second CIA
report, ‘The Iraqi Ba’ath Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam’,
dated
31 October,
assessed that many bureaucrats had joined the Ba’ath Party to
attain their
positions,
were not “ardent supporters of Saddam” and “could probably remain …
[after
having
been] investigated and vetted”. The report stated, however, that
the CIA did not
know much
about the loyalties, party affiliations, or potential criminal
activities of most
Iraqi
military officers and government bureaucrats.
605.
It is not
clear whether either report was seen by officials in the
UK.
606.
FCO briefing
on post-conflict issues for Mr Straw’s visit to Washington on 14
and
15 October,
prepared on 10 October, reflected the conclusions of the FCO papers
for
607.
Suggested
points for Mr Straw to raise included a list of reasons why it
would not
be easy to
decide what new governmental structures should look
like:
“–
ethnic/religious/tribal mix;
– residual
Ba’ath influence;
– uneven
distribution of resources;
– lack of
political infrastructure or unifying figure;
– scope for
neighbours to meddle.”
608.
Officials
suggested that Mr Straw seek agreement to “a few underlying
principles:
– Iraq to
remain a unitary state;
– no need
for root and branch dismantling of government;
– Iraqis
should determine their own government; and
– need for
more representative government, but not necessarily full
democracy
in short
term.”
609.
Other points
covered in the briefing included the need for:
•
“a credible
legal base and UN framework”;
•
a clear
exit strategy built on an understanding of what Iraq could look
like and
a process
for getting there;
•
a
commitment to stay “as long as necessary”; and
•
recognition
that although it would be difficult to minimise the risk of
Iraq’s
disintegration,
it was important not to fall into the “opposite trap of
exaggerating
Iraq’s
fragility.”
313
Paper
Middle East Department, 10 October 2002, ‘Foreign Secretary’s visit
to Washington,
14-15
October, Iraq: forward thinking’.
217