3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
231.
Cabinet
Ministers raised a number of points in the subsequent
discussion,
including:
•
“it was
important to distinguish between the campaign against
international
terrorism
and efforts to address the threat to international peace posed by
the
Iraqi
regime’s continuing development of WMD”.
•
It would be
“more difficult to convince the public of the need for military
action”
in Iraq
than it had been for Afghanistan. “It would be necessary to have a
clear
legal basis
for military action and to convince people that the situation
had
deteriorated
sufficiently to justify military action”.
•
“any
military action would create new tensions” in the UK, “particularly
within the
Moslem
community. The domestic impact of action would have to be
weighed
carefully
before any decisions were taken”.
•
“it would
be important to secure maximum international support … before
any
military
action took place. Western policy would have to be carefully
calibrated to
convince
President Saddam Hussein that military action would ensue if he
failed
to comply
with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, without
making
such action
inevitable”.
•
The
“military action in December 1998 [Operation Desert Fox], while
meeting
the
objectives set out by the Coalition at the time, had boosted …
Saddam
Hussein’s
reputation on the Arab Street. The Iraqi regime was a more
formidable
opponent
than the Taliban regime in Afghanistan”.
•
“to isolate
… Saddam Hussein” it would be “necessary to make
progress
towards
resolving the Israel/Palestine problem” to avoid accusations
that
the West
was “not being even handed”. “Many people believed” that the
US
Government
was an “uncritical” supporter of the Government of Israel. Mr
Blair
“could play
a key role” in persuading the US to make clear that was not the
case.
“… the
concerns expressed in discussion were justified. It was important
that the
United
States did not appear to be acting unilaterally. It was critically
important
to
reinvigorate the Middle East Peace Process. Any military action
taken against
President
Saddam Hussein’s regime had to be effective. On the other hand,
the
Iraqi
regime was in clear breach of its obligations under several United
Nations
Security
Council resolutions. Its WMD programmes posed a threat to peace.
Iraq’s
neighbours
regarded President Saddam Hussein as a danger. The right
strategy
was to
engage closely with the Government of the United States in order to
be in
a position
to shape policy and its presentation. The international community
should
proceed in
a measured but determined way to decide how to respond to the
real
threat
represented by the Iraqi regime. No decisions to launch military
action had
been taken
and any action taken would be in accordance with international
law.”
233.
The Cabinet,
“Took note, with approval.”
427