12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1128.
Mr Asquith
told the Inquiry:
“Personally,
I was sceptical that the surge would be effective and was
unsure
whether the
real objective of agreeing the local cease‑fires with some of the
Sunni
Arab areas’
tribal leaders was designed to minimise the casualties of US forces
or
was really
designed to build them into the political process. My suspicions
were
that the
first objective … was probably a more important one in the minds of
the
military
planners, and I was sceptical that they would be successful in
persuading,
particularly
the Sunni Arab tribal leaders, to be loyal to a Shia‑led government
in
Baghdad.
“I think in
retrospect I was wrong and I think the surge did produce what
General
Petraeus
was seeking to achieve by it, not just to create the sort of
breathing space
for some
politics to work, but that it did, more sustainably than I assumed,
quieten
those areas
which were extremely violent.”1063
The DoD
reported on 2 March 2007 that MNSTC‑I had trained 28,400 Department
of
Border
Enforcement (DBE) and Port of Entry (POE) personnel and that the
DBE was
supported
by 28 Coalition Border Transition Teams.1064
Later in
the year a joint DBE and MNSTC‑I five‑year plan was developed to
bring the total
number of
constructed border forts and annexes to 7231065
and to
increase the personnel
requirement
to 46,000.1066
On 6
September, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in
Iraq reported to
Congress
its conclusion that:
“Iraq’s
border security forces are generally ineffective and need more
equipment,
training,
and infrastructure before they can play a significant role in
securing Iraq’s
borders.
The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor support
from
the
Ministry of Interior. Overall border security is undermined by the
division of
responsibilities
between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
Transportation.
Corruption
and external infiltration of the border security forces are
widespread, and
the borders
are porous.”1067
On 18
December 2008, the JIC assessed that the DBE “suffer from
departmental
underinvestment
and corruption” and “are unable to protect Iraq’s
borders”.1068
By August
2010, the DBE had 40,000 personnel and operated out of 657 forts
and
annexes.1069
It was
estimated that over 60,000 personnel would be required to staff
the
planned
number of forts.
1063
Public
hearing, 4 December 2009, page 30.
1064
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1065
Report, 6
September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in
Iraq’.
1066
Report to
Congress, 7 March 2008, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1067
Report, 6
September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in
Iraq’.
1068
JIC
Assessment, 18 December 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Mixed
Abilities’.
1069
Report to
Congress, 20 August 2010, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
319