The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
323.
Iraq had also
provided documentation about questions and concerns
which
had
remained since 1998 about weapons and centrifuge design, but the
documents
contained
“no new information”. Dr ElBaradei hoped that “the new Iraqi
commissions
… will be
able to discover documents and other evidence that could assist in
clarifying
remaining
questions and concerns”.
324.
Dr ElBaradei
had “reported on numerous occasions” that the IAEA
had:
“… by
December 1998 … concluded that it had neutralised Iraq’s past
nuclear
programme
and that therefore no unresolved disarmament issues remained
…
Hence, our
focus since the resumption of inspections … has been verifying
whether
Iraq
revived its nuclear programme in the intervening
years.
“We have to
date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or
nuclear-related
activities
in Iraq. However … a number of issues are still under investigation
… we
intend to
make full use of the authority granted to us … to build as much
capacity
into the
inspection process as necessary.
“In that
context, I would underline the importance of information that
States may
be able to
provide to help us in assessing the accuracy and completeness
of
information
provided by Iraq.”
325.
Mr Straw
thanked Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei for “their great efforts in the
face
of what I
think is still very clear: Iraq’s failure, fully and actively to
comply with
resolution 1441”.
326.
Mr Straw
stated that the issue, which “could not be graver”, was “about
the
authority
of the United Nations and about the responsibility of the Security
Council for
international
peace and security”. All the members of the Council knew that Iraq
had
“had these
weapons [of mass destruction and long-range missiles]”; Iraq had
been
“found
guilty” in 1991. The issue was whether Iraq was “actively
co-operating to get rid
of
them”.
327.
Mr Straw
stated that Iraq had lied, had concealed weapons and played
games.
As Dr
Blix and Dr ElBaradei had:
“… spelled
out in their report of 27 January, Iraq has failed to account for
thousands
of tons of
chemical weapons and precursor chemicals, of shells and bombs
for
anthrax,
for mustard gas, for VX nerve agent. They have failed to make a
full and
complete
disclosure as required of them … They have failed to co-operate
fully
and
actively on substance, as well as on process with the inspectors,
and failed
substantively
to meet the obligations imposed on them.”
328.
Iraq
continued to state that it did not possess weapons of mass
destruction.
329.
Mr Aldouri
stated that Iraq had agreed to act on resolution 1441 and had
“provided
everything
that might fall within the concept of pro-active Iraqi
co-operation”. The
352