9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
– the fact
that Maliki felt moved to intervene so precipitously in Basra,
along with
the ISF’s
lack of success in the first week of the operation, led to a
renewal of
unfavourable
comment from the US, GoI and the media about the state of
Basra
when we
handed it over to Iraqi control; our failure to deal effectively
with the
militias;
and the readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces we had
trained.”
81.
The paper also
said that the UK’s relationship with Prime Minister Maliki had
been:
“… severely
tested by the events of late March: he believed that we had done
deals
to allow
JAM control of Basra, and that we were consequently unwilling to
support
the GoI and
ISF … we cannot be confident that he values or appreciates the
UK
military
role in the South, or that he would be particularly concerned by
the timing
of our
departure.”
82.
On 13 June,
Maj Gen White-Spunner sent Lieutenant General Nicholas
Houghton,
Chief of
Joint Operations, an overview of MND(SE) prior to his visit to
Iraq.26
He
wrote:
“The
overall mood across Iraq is positive, with attacks at a low level.
The success
of the
GoI’s initiatives in Sadr City and Mosul, together with the
perception that AQ
and the
Sunni insurgency are nearing defeat, have, of course, contributed
to this,
but from a
Basrawi perspective the improvement started with Charge of the
Knights
in Basra,
being Maliki’s first sign of willingness to act against the
militias and criminal
gangs … a
new confidence has emerged in the city, with people openly
speaking
of life
being better than it has been for years and a mood of optimism
equal to that
experienced
in 2003.”
83.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner commented: “There is a sense that the city is just
waking
from a
nightmare and rubbing its eyes as it contemplates what could turn
out to be a
fine day,
although it is too early to be sure.”
84.
On 13 June,
Muqtada al-Sadr declared that JAM would be re-organised
from
a militia
into a primarily civilian, religious, social and cultural
organisation, called
‘Mumahiidun’
(Showing the Way), and its members would be banned from
carrying
weapons.27
He added
that a minority of JAM would be retained to resist the
occupation.
85.
On 13 June,
Mr Brown’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs emailed
Mr Brown
advice from
Mr McDonald, explaining as he did that: “We asked Simon
[McDonald] to
have
another go at the Iraq numbers.”28
86.
Mr McDonald
advised that it would be possible to reduce UK troop numbers
to
2,000 by
the end of 2008 if the US assumed a number of the current key UK
roles,
specifically
either the training of 14 Division or the provision of enabling
support.
26
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 13 June 2008, ‘MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 13
June 08’.
27
JIC
Assessment, 10 September 2008, ‘Iraq: The Future of Jaysh
al-Mahdi’.
28
Email
Fletcher to Brown, 13 June 2008, ‘Iraq Troop Numbers’.
395