12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
backdrop of
the very difficult security environment in Iraq” and that “security
concerns
have
inevitably delayed some of ILAC’s work”.
658.
An update on
donor support to the Iraqi justice sector was attached to
Mr Benn’s
letter.
This identified a number of constraints that were limiting access
to justice,
including
the lack of scrutiny over court procedures, irregular sentencing,
and weak
integration
between the police, courts and prisons. The update stated that
“donor activity
would
benefit from a more co‑ordinated and strategic approach, under the
guidance of
the Iraqi
Minister of Justice and Chief Justice”.
659.
On 12 January,
ILAC submitted their annual report on the Justice Sector
Support
programme
to DFID.602
Security
was described as “the major constraint faced by legal
professionals”
and was listed as a risk to delivery against all programme outputs.
ILAC
warned that
costs would be £182,000 higher than their grant proposal because
the
assumption
had been that in 2005 training would be delivered inside Iraq; the
security
situation
dictated that training would have to continue outside.
660.
ILAC reported
“no substantial progress” with regard to strengthening
the
admission
requirements or disciplinary procedures of the Iraqi Bar
Association (IBA). It
wrote that
“politicking” by the IBA leadership would continue to be a risk to
the selection
of
delegation members. ILAC plans for 2005 included “ways of
ameliorating this”. The
Judicial
Training Institute remained closed with “no immediate plans to
reopen”. It was
“disappointing”
that it had “not been possible to engage that important
institution”.
661.
A draft
version of a Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) dated 27 December
2004
was
circulated amongst officials on 2 March 2005 (it is described in
more detail later in
this
Section).603
The report
recommended “the continuation of training of judiciary
and
linking aid
to independence of judiciary”.
662.
In the Global
Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) Strategy meeting on 7 April, it
was
reported
that the SCA recommended “supporting the justice
sector”.604
However,
while
there were
“clear links” to the IMOD, MOI and SSR activities, “it was decided
that the
GCPP could
not fund any sustainable development in the area with funds
available”.
663.
In
Mr Blair’s weekly Iraq update on 9 December 2004,
Mr Quarrey reported that an
upcoming
JIC Assessment on Iraqiisation was likely to conclude that
“progress remains
slow” and
that “we will not hit a key target for handing over ‘provincial
control’ to Iraqi
security
forces across the country by mid‑2005”.605
602
Letter
Hoddinott to [Consultant], 12 January 2005, ‘ILAC Iraq Justice
Sector Support – Annual Report
2004, Grant
AG3737’.
603
Email DFID
[junior official] to DFID [junior official], 2 March 2005, ‘Review
of policing work’ attaching
Paper
‘Strategic Conflict Assessment – Iraq’.
604
Minutes, 7
April 2005, Iraq GCPP Strategy meeting.
605
Minute
Quarrey to Blair, 9 December 2004, ‘Iraq Update’.
199