The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1112.
There were
four “bands” of physical protection that could be added
incrementally
to camps to
counter the IDF threat:
•
Compartmentalisation
– found in “most camps” in Iraq and undergoing
“enhancement
work”. Its effectiveness was partially restricted by the
layout
of camps
but overall offered 10 to 80 percent lower casualty
rates.
•
Ballistic
refuge shelter – for personnel to occupy when a warning of attack
was
given and
used as accommodation during the height of the August 2004
attacks.
It was
assessed that the shelters were “of little value” in the current
improved
security
situation.
•
Hardened
temporary accommodation – provided permanently
occupied,
purpose‑built
but improvised sleeping accommodation with air conditioning
and
lighting.
CITADEL was an example. Providing CITADEL for all UK troops in
Iraq
would cost
£35m, would take “in excess of 12 months” to complete and
would
require
significant amounts of logistical and construction assets. The
quality and
comfort of
CITADEL would be “significantly lower than that currently
occupied”
and the
investment in the first two bands of accommodation would be
wasted.
•
Purpose‑built
protected building – not considered appropriate for use in
Iraq
because of
“cost, time to build and permanence”.
1113.
AM Torpy wrote
that it was “possible to mitigate against the likelihood
and
significance”
of IDF attacks “through a package of mutually supporting TTPs
and
engineering
force protection measures”. He stated that events had shown that
the level
of attacks
would “oscillate”. Compartmentalisation was “suitable” protection
“in light of
the risk
across Iraq” but those measures should be “constantly reviewed” in
relation to
changes in
or development of the threat.
1114.
Gen Walker
introduced AM Torpy’s paper at the Chiefs of Staff meeting
on
23 March.588
The Chiefs
were invited to consider the recommendation not to
introduce
CITADEL “in
view of the risk to our forces and the degree of additional
protection that
might be
afforded by CITADELs; the length of time that UK forces will remain
in Iraq; the
cost of
procuring and setting up CITADELs; the message that might be sent
by building
CITADELs
this far into the campaign; and the consequences of an AIF
[anti‑Iraqi forces]
attack
similar to that which the US have experienced”.
1115.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that:
“ … in view
of the potential to draw down to SS [“steady state”] by mid‑05,
providing
CITADELs
would mean fortifying our camps just as troops were ready to leave
Iraq;
only if the
campaign were to be drawn out would this investment be
worthwhile.
It was also
considered that fortifying camps at this stage would send the
wrong
message to
all parties and run counter to any announcements on
drawdown.
The
unanimous view was that compartmentalisation and active force
protection
588
Minutes, 23
March 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
190