Executive
Summary
In any
event, following 9/11 and Afghanistan we were a terrorist target
and, as recent
events in
Europe and the US show, irrespective of Iraq, there are ample
justifications
such
terrorists will use as excuses for terrorism.”172
359.
The UK’s
relationship with the US was a determining factor in the
Government’s
decisions
over Iraq.
360.
It was the US
Administration which decided in late 2001 to make dealing with
the
problem of
Saddam Hussein’s regime the second priority, after the ousting of
the Taliban
in
Afghanistan, in the “Global War on Terror”. In that period, the US
Administration turned
against a
strategy of continued containment of Iraq, which it was pursuing
before the
9/11
attacks.
361.
This was not,
initially, the view of the UK Government. Its stated view at that
time
was that
containment had been broadly effective, and that it could be
adapted in order
to remain
sustainable. Containment continued to be the declared policy of the
UK
throughout
the first half of 2002.
362.
The declared
objectives of the UK and the US towards Iraq up to the time of
the
invasion
differed. The US was explicitly seeking to achieve a change of
regime; the UK
to achieve
the disarmament of Iraq, as required by UN Security Council
resolutions.
363.
Most
crucially, the US Administration committed itself to a timetable
for military
action
which did not align with, and eventually overrode, the timetable
and processes
for
inspections in Iraq which had been set by the UN Security Council.
The UK wanted
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA to have time to complete their work, and wanted the
support
of the
Security Council, and of the international community more widely,
before any
further
steps were taken. This option was foreclosed by the US
decision.
364.
On these and
other important points, including the planning for the
post‑conflict
period and
the functioning of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the
UK
Government
decided that it was right or necessary to defer to its close ally
and senior
partner,
the US.
365.
It did so
essentially for two reasons:
•
Concern
that vital areas of co‑operation between the UK and the US
could
be damaged
if the UK did not give the US its full support over
Iraq.
•
The belief
that the best way to influence US policy towards the
direction
preferred
by the UK was to commit full and unqualified support, and
seek
to persuade
from the inside.
172
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 16.
51