The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the need
for a large peace‑keeping force “to keep a lid on the ethnic
and
religious
tensions that Saddam’s dictatorship has hidden for so long”;
and
•
the
pressure for a “generous [reconstruction] package, given the
perception
in the
region that invading Iraq is of dubious legality and
worth”.
186.
On who would
pay for that generous package, the official assessed
that:
“… the US
might expect Iraq to pick up the bill after a short ‘bridging’
period,
especially
as – with investment – oil revenues could quickly exceed US$20
billion
per
year.
“But it is
more likely that strong pressure will come to bear on the US and
its allies
to pay
the lion’s share, given their role in the war …”
187.
The official
did not consider what the UK’s contribution to meeting post‑war
costs
might
be.
188.
The Inquiry
has seen no evidence that Mr Brown responded to this analysis,
or that
it was
circulated outside the Treasury.
189.
Mr Brown
told the Inquiry that the Treasury was among the first to consider
the
challenges
involved in reconstruction.124
190.
From 20
September 2002, the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq (AHGI) co‑ordinated
all
non‑military
cross‑government work on post‑conflict issues (see Section 6.4).
The AHGI
was chaired
by the Cabinet Office.
191.
Mr Alistair
Fernie, Head of DFID’s Middle East and North Africa
Department,
circulated
a draft paper on the potential humanitarian implications of
conflict in Iraq to
members of
the AHGI on 11 October, with the caveat that the paper had not yet
been
seen by
Ms Short or other departments.125
192.
The draft
paper stated that:
“Any
large‑scale UK humanitarian response would require additional
funding from
the Central
Reserve. DFID’s existing small (£6m) humanitarian programme in
Iraq
is fully
committed; available humanitarian funds within CHAD [DFID’s
Conflict and
Humanitarian
Affairs Department] are likely to be grossly insufficient and most
of
DFID’s
Contingency Reserve has already been allocated.”
193.
On 4 November,
Mr Fernie invited Ms Short to agree that a revised
version of
the paper
should be shared with the US as a work in progress.126
He advised
that the
124
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, page 19.
125
Letter
Fernie to Dodd, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Contingency
Planning’ attaching Paper
[draft]
DFID, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential Humanitarian
Implications’.
126
Minute
Fernie to Private Secretary/Secretary of State [DFID], 4 November
2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency
Planning:
Humanitarian Paper’ attaching Paper DFID, 5 November 2002 [sic],
‘Iraq: Potential
Humanitarian
Implications’.
474