3.1 | Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002

68. Dr Rice told the Commission that the US Administration had been concerned that

Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that, in the first Camp David

session chaired by the President, Mr Rumsfeld had asked what the Administration

should do about Iraq; and that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had made the case for

striking Iraq during “this round” of the war on terrorism.

69. Dr Rice also told the Commission that a Department of Defense (DoD) briefing

paper for the meeting, on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism, had specified

three priority targets for initial action: Al Qaida, the Taliban, and Iraq. The paper had

argued that Al Qaida and Iraq both posed a strategic threat to the United States,

citing Iraq’s long-standing involvement in terrorism and its interest in weapons of

mass of destruction.

70. Secretary Powell told the Commission that: “Paul [Wolfowitz] was always of the view

that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with … And he saw this as one way of using

this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem.” President Bush saw Afghanistan as

the priority.

71. In his memoir, Decision Points, President Bush recorded:

• Secretary Rumsfeld had said: “Dealing with Iraq would show a major

commitment to antiterrorism.”

• Secretary Powell had cautioned against it and Mr Tenet had agreed.

• Vice President Cheney had “understood the threat of Saddam Hussein and

believed we had to address it. But now is not a good time to do it … We would

lose our momentum.”38

72. Mr Tenet wrote:

“When an informal vote was taken on whether to include Iraq in our immediate

response plans, the principals voted four to zero against it, with Don Rumsfeld

abstaining.”39

73. According to his memoir, President Bush took the decision on 16 September that:

“Unless I received definitive evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 plot, I would

work to resolve the Iraq problem diplomatically. I hoped unified pressure by the world

might compel Saddam to meet his international obligations. The best way to show

him we were serious was to succeed in Afghanistan.”40

38 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

39 Tenet G & Harlow B. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. HarperPress, 2007.

40 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

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