14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
access to
helicopters in order to move beyond Basra city” and that “greater
use of
existing
theatre helicopters, if feasible, should assist
this”.514
976.
An air bridge
would be required for FCO, DFID and other government
personnel
to operate
out of Basra from the British Embassy Office based at Basra Palace
to Basra
airport.
The paper stated:
“We
will need to allocate more resources, which may include
military
resources, to
security. The next
weeks, and possibly months, are likely to be
rough.
Attacks on us are becoming more sophisticated. We will need to
protect
our staff.”
977.
On 14 October,
Air Marshal Chris Nickols, Assistant Chief of the Defence
Staff
(Operations),515
wrote to
PJHQ, agreeing to provide additional Merlin
helicopters.516
978.
AM Nickols
also agreed an uplift of 180 Merlin hours per month for
JHF‑I
until mid‑December.
He cited JHC’s declaration that the previously agreed
support
surge commitment
had to end by 5 December for “fleet sustainability issues”.
The
longer‑term
requirements should be identified “as early as possible” through
PJHQ’s
Force Level
Review.
979.
AM Nickols
wrote that, in the meantime, he was tasking the Director
of
the Directorate
of Joint Capability517
to lead a
wider battlefield helicopter review
to provide
“a clear and early understanding of our options/impact should
surge
980.
A note to Dr
Reid on 17 October explained that the additional Merlin was found
by
reducing
MOD support to capability demonstrations in the US.519
981.
Gen Jackson
visited Iraq from 10 to 13 October.520
His account of
the EFP threat
is covered
earlier in this Section. He also wrote that a number of issues had
been raised
by MND(SE),
“all relating to our ability to sustain expeditionary operations”.
He wrote:
“… our
Support Helicopter Fleet is creaking badly. JHF‑I [Joint Helicopter
Force –
Iraq] is
struggling to meet its tasks even with rigorous prioritisation …
Serviceability,
514
Letter
Hayes to Quarrey, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra’ attaching Paper
FCO/MOD/DFID,
30 September
2005, ‘South‑East Iraq: Impact of Security Incident in
Basra’.
515
It is
unclear what date in October 2005 AM Nickols succeeded
Maj Gen Houghton, the previous
incumbent
of this role. It seems that AM Nickols would have been in the post
at this time.
516
Minute
ACDS(Ops) to PJHQ – DCJO(Ops), 14 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Additional
Resources to Counter
Increased
IED threat in MND(SE)’.
517
The MOD has
confirmed that Commodore Peter Eberle was in this role until
October 2005 but not
the
specific date. The MOD has not been able to identify the post
holder between November 2005 and
May 2006.
518
Minute
ACDS(Ops) to PJHQ – DCJO(Ops), 14 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Additional
Resources to Counter
Increased
IED threat in MND(SE)’.
519
Minute
DJC [junior
official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 17 October 2005, ‘Iraq:
Additional Resources for
MND(SE)’.
520
Report CGS
to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 10‑13 Oct
05’.
165