3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

the UK should continue to explore with the US the possibility of adding an ultimatum,

aimed particularly at getting Saddam to step down, to the draft resolution.79

283. Two possible options for an ultimatum in a draft resolution were set out:

“Decides that unless the Council concludes before x March 2003 that a government

has emerged in Iraq which [intends to] [has demonstrated its intention to] [has

taken an unconditional and irreversible decision to] come into compliance with its

obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) and previous relevant resolutions, Iraq

will face the serious consequences it has been repeatedly warned of, including in

para 13 of resolution 1441 (2002).”

Or:

“Decides that unless the Council concludes before x March 2003 that the

government of Iraq has taken an unconditional and irreversible decision to come into

compliance with its obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) and previous relevant

resolutions, Iraq will face the serious consequences it has repeatedly been warned

of, including in para 13 of resolution 1441 (2002).”

284. The telegram also set out the option, identified by Mr Straw following his third

conversation with Secretary Powell on 11 February, of taking soundings before tabling

an ultimatum.

285. In relation to Sir Jeremy’s own suggestions, the FCO took the view that there

would be “serious obstacles”. It did not think that authorising all necessary means

to hunt down WMD would meet the disarmament objectives, particularly if Baghdad

and other cities were left aside. The key was:

“… co-operation rather than resources. For example work on BW can be very

easily concealed under legitimate guises … Without full access to documents and

full co-operation from personnel, it would be impossible to guarantee success.”

286. The FCO also identified difficulties with providing scientists “adequate protection

while they remain under Saddam’s regime”, and practical problems with assembling

and protecting a UN force.

287. The record of the FCO Iraq evening meeting on 12 February reported concerns

that some members of the US Administration were “increasingly inclined” to table the

resolution straight after Dr Blix’s report to the Security Council on 14 February.80

288. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told Dr Blix that the US was worried about

losing backing and momentum and saw only one way to deal with Iraq’s

non-co-operation.

79 Telegram [number unknown] FCO London to UKMIS New York, 12 February 2003,

‘Iraq – Second Resolution’.

80 Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 12 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Evening Meeting: Key Points’.

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