9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
produce a
formal balance of power that relies on sectarian divide (possibly
partition)
backed by
the threat of a descent into civil war. Hardly the basis for
long‑term
stability
and well short of a liberal democracy. Such a scenario does not
have to
assume an
unacceptable level of Iranian influence over Iraqi politics but it
does
assume
some.”
220.
Mr Browne
concluded:
“… we
should acknowledge that in all the scenarios we can envisage,
these
decisions
and the transition process will become increasingly political – and
we may
have to be
prepared to accept a larger degree of risk.”
221.
In
conversation on 19 October, Mr Blair told President Bush that
the initial signs
from Op
SINBAD were positive, in part because the ISF carrying out the
operation
were “more
compatible with the environment there”.134
He
suggested that the US and
UK should
challenge Prime Minister Maliki’s judgement that action against
Shia militias
should be
delayed.
222.
Briefing for
the conversation by Mr Blair’s Private Secretary contained a
downbeat
assessment
of developments in Baghdad.135
Although
violence was reducing as the
MNF moved
into an area, it then began to creep back in and finally rise
rapidly when the
MNF handed
over to the ISF. Often this took violence to a similar or higher
level than
before.
Levels of attacks across the city as a whole had risen, and the
majority of areas
had
experienced an increase in the number of bodies being
found.
223.
Members of
DOP(I) discussed the paper on medium term prospects at
their
meeting on
20 October.136
Mr Blair
was not present, and so the meeting was chaired by
Mr Browne.
224.
Mr Browne
began by saying that the existing goal would be difficult to
achieve, but
Ministers
had to be certain that there was not more the UK could do before
accepting
anything
less. Mrs Beckett agreed that the new Iraqi Government was not
delivering as
well as had
been hoped. The long term objectives would be affected by the
acceptability
of the
coalition presence, which appeared to be declining faster than had
been
envisaged.
225.
In discussion,
a member of DOP(I) said that most DFID projects in the South
were
likely to
be completed by spring 2007 and that no new projects could be
started under
current
security circumstances. US policy was uncertain; current US force
levels were
viewed as
unsustainable. The proposed level of UK forces (4,500) was
predicated on
134
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 19 October 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush,
19 October:
Middle East issues’.
135
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 19 October 2006, ‘VTC with President
Bush – 1505,
19 October
2006’.
136
Minutes
(revised), 20 October 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
45