The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
752.
By March 2006,
senior members of the UK military were considering the
possibility
of civil
war in Iraq, prompted by rising levels of sectarian violence and
concerns that the
Iraqi
Government was “not ... perceived as even‑handed in security
issues”.263
The
risk
of civil
war had been acknowledged by Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja’afari in the
wake of the
bombing of
the al‑Askari mosque in February. Although there was general
agreement
that the
situation in Iraq did not constitute civil war, the risk that one
might develop was
considered
to be real.
753.
At this time,
the presence in Iraq of the MNF was authorised by resolution
1637
(2005). The
exchange of letters between Prime Minister Ja’afari and the
President of the
Security
Council which accompanied the resolution clearly identified
providing security
for the
Iraqi people as the reason why a continued MNF presence was
necessary.
754.
In late April,
FCO officials were concerned that security in Basra was
declining
and that a
determined and sustained effort, including a more assertive
military posture,
would be
required to deliver the UK’s objective of transferring Basra to
Iraqi control by
late 2006
or early 2007.
755.
Accounts from
mid‑2006 suggested that security in MND(SE) was a
significant
concern,
characterised by “steady, if generally unspectacular,
decline”264
and
increased
militia
activity. The UK military’s approach had generated US concern and
the security
situation
was limiting UK civilian activity.
756.
Gen Jackson’s
assessment in May of the short‑term security prospects in
Iraq
was bleak.
He judged that “what we will leave behind will not look much like
strategic
success.
Ten years hence our strategy may fully bear fruit.”265
757.
After visiting
Iraq in early May, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief
of the
Defence
Staff, advised Dr Reid that there should be no change to the
operational
approach
and that there were “compelling reasons” why the UK should “press
on”
with
handing over security to Iraq, including to permit the UK’s
continuing build‑up in
Afghanistan.266
ACM Stirrup
identified the risk that UK withdrawal from Basra would
be
seen as a
“strategic failure” and suggested that “astute conditioning of the
UK public
may be
necessary” to avoid that.
758.
ACM Stirrup’s
view that the UK should press ahead with drawdown despite
the
security
challenges in Basra was not consistent with Government policy that
withdrawal
should be
conditions‑based.
263
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 5 March 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (201) 5 March
06’.
264
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East to
Dowse, 12 May 2006, ‘Situation in
Basrah’.
265
Minute CGS
to CDS, 22 May 2006, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 15‑18 May
06’.
266
Minute
Stirrup to SofS [MOD], 8 May 2006, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq and
Afghanistan – 5‑7 May 06’.
104