The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1092.
A further JIC
Assessment on 24 November stated:
“The UIA
[United Iraqi Alliance] recognises the need to build ISF
capabilities, but
ISF
credibility as impartial, national forces is being damaged by the
main Shia
factions
entrenching their influence – and in some cases control – over
state
security
structures. […] SCIRI’s Badr Organisation is the most organised,
placing its
members in
important positions within the Ministries […]. The Jaysh al Mahdi
(JAM),
largely
under the control of Sadr, has been less systematic, but controls
the police in
many Shia
areas through infiltration and intimidation. The relative influence
of SCIRI/
Badr and
JAM in the ISF varies across the Shia areas of central and southern
Iraq;
their
rivalry has led to serious violence in places, most recently in
al‑Amara.
“Shia
militias provide protection and leverage to Shia political parties.
In a climate
of poor
security and political uncertainty, we see no prospect that
SCIRI/Badr, Sadr/
JAM and
others will willingly give up their power. Maliki has made some
attempts to
get rid of
sectarian elements within the ISF […]. He says he is pursuing a
strategy
with the
Sadrists to bind them more tightly into the political process while
gathering
the
necessary political backing to take tough action against renegade
JAM elements.
[…] By
aligning himself with the Sadrists, Maliki risks alienating
SCIRI/Badr.”1012
A Report to
Congress on 30 November 2006 stated that the MOI’s emphasis
on
tactical
skills meant that little resource was left for training for or
conducting criminal
investigations.1013
As a
result, corruption and smuggling were becoming more
organised
and
entrenched. The CPATT was seeking to address that by strengthening
the Iraqi
Major
Crimes Task Force and the Major Crimes Unit. In addition, there
were discussions
between the
MOI and MNSTC‑I about improving Iraq’s forensic investigative
capabilities
by adding
several thousand forensic specialists to the police
forces.
In November
2006, the British Embassy Baghdad produced a ‘Police Forward Look’
that
suggested
the UK’s aim was to move its “assistance increasingly to
higher‑level mentoring
and
support”.1014
It
identified seven work strands in Baghdad, a number of which
were
expected to
transfer to an Iraqi lead during 2007:
•
TIPS – CPATT
was likely to move the hotline to the MOI “in the next
few
months”.
Without a significant increase in resources, the UK
contribution
(ArmorGroup)
was judged to be unsustainable and it was recommended that
it
be drawn
down by March 2007 “at the latest”. Despite being “the UK’s
biggest
success
story”, it “was not part of our original remit”. TIPS is described
earlier in
this
Section in the Box, ‘TIPS hotline’.
•
Forensics –
the Baghdad laboratory and training academy were open
with “significant”
support from UK police officers and ArmorGroup. They
aimed to be
completely Iraqi‑led by the end of 2007; the Basra equivalent
was
“now
the priority”.
1012
JIC
Assessment, 24 November 2006, ‘Iraq: What do the Shia
want?’.
1013
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1014
Paper BE
Baghdad, November 2006, ‘Police Forward Look’.
308