6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
689.
In their joint
minute, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon warned that some issues
“could
confront us
as early as next week” and invited agreement to five
propositions:
“(a) The
maximum size of task that UK forces would contribute to in the
early days
should not
exceed our overall military capability. A focus in the South-East
of
Iraq would
be reasonable.
(b) The UK
contribution to such a task in advance of a Security Council
resolution
would be
limited to the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and a
secure
environment
and the elimination of WMD.
(c) We
therefore need to agree urgently with the US a realistic
authorising Security
Council
resolution for post-conflict Iraq.
(d) We
should agree urgently a plan with the US to help us find military
partners
to enable
us to draw down and, in due course, design an exit
strategy.
(e) In
broad terms the MOD will need to draw down its scale of effort to
nearer
a third of
its commitment by the autumn.”250
690.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon gave little detail of what UK forces would be required to
do
immediately
after the invasion:
“Much will
depend on how the campaign develops, but in the first few weeks
we
should
expect Coalition Forces to be spread across Iraq. The expectation
is that UK
forces will
end up in southern Iraq, loosely centred on Basra. However, we
should be
prepared
for elements of our forces to be dispersed fairly widely across
Iraq …
“US
military planning continues to be fluid. But it envisages Coalition
Forces re-
deploying
into a more tailored security framework as soon as the situation
permits.
The
military task will be to facilitate a secure environment (including
law and order,
deterring
adventurism and a variety of military-technical tasks) to enable
immediate
humanitarian
relief to be conducted …
“The
expectation is that UK forces would be responsible for a task
focused on
Basra and
other key military objectives in the South-East of Iraq, which
could include
20 percent
of the Iraqi population. This task is broadly proportionate to the
size
of the UK’s
contribution to overall Coalition land forces …
“In
parallel, and under the overall military command, the US plan to
bring in a
transitional
administration251
to
co-ordinate immediate civil relief and humanitarian
assistance.
The transitional administration is making plans for allocating its
limited
resources,
including provision of public sector salaries, on a nation wide,
Coalition
basis.
There is no expectation that the UK would be asked to contribute
any
250
Minute
Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
Post-Conflict
Iraq’.
251 A
footnote explained: “The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA) becomes
the
transitional administration once it is established inside Iraq.”
ORHA’s role is described in more detail
in Section
6.5.
497