1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
148.
Resolution 707
(1991), adopted on 15 August, condemned Iraq’s:
“… serious
violation of a number of its obligations under section C of
resolution 687
(1991) and
of its undertakings to co-operate with the Special Commission and
the
IAEA, which
constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of
resolution
687 which
established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to
the
restoration
of peace and security in the region.”59
149.
The resolution
also condemned Iraq’s “non-compliance” with its
obligations
under its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which constituted a “violation
of its
commitments”
as a party to the NPT.
150.
The demands in
the resolution included that Iraq should:
•
“provide
full, final and complete disclosure … of all aspects” of its
prohibited
programmes
and comply with its other obligations and co-operate with
the
Special
Commission and IAEA “without further delay”;
•
allow
UNSCOM, the IAEA and their inspection teams “immediate,
unconditional
and
unrestricted access”;
•
“cease
immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or
destruction
of any
material or equipment” without notification to and prior consent
from
UNSCOM;
and
•
“halt all
nuclear activities of any kind”.
151.
In his memoir,
Dr Blix wrote that between May and September 1991,
IAEA
inspections
teams had produced “spectacular” results and the documents
recovered
provided
“crucial and convincing evidence” about Iraq’s nuclear
programme.60
152.
Dr Blix wrote
that “the revelation that Iraq had secretly enriched uranium
without
being
detected shook the world” and resulted in agreement that it was
necessary to
sharpen the
IAEA system of safeguards.
153.
In September
1991, an IAEA inspection team led by Dr David Kay
discovered
significant
volumes of documents about Iraq’s nuclear weapons.
154.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Ekéus said that the
identification of the building
in central
Baghdad containing documentation about Iraq’s nuclear programme was
as
a result
of data provided by the US.61
155.
The
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (The
Butler Report)
records
that, in an Assessment in October 1991, the JIC noted that
inspection had
confirmed
the existence of a comprehensive nuclear weapons programme
and
concluded:
59
UN Security
Council resolution 707 (1991).
60
Blix
H. Disarming
Iraq.
Bloomsbury, 2004.
61
Statement
Ekéus, 23 April 2011, page 3.
51