The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“rather than the political level”. He suggested further talks with the US at a senior

political level “if the Chiefs judge there is a real danger of US disaffection”.

813. Mr Westmacott reported on 16 October that he had been told by a senior Turkish

official that Turkey assumed that, if the UK decided it wanted to join the US in making

military deployments in or through Turkey in support of a UN resolution, it would let

Turkey know in good time.319 Without Security Council authorisation, it was “quite

possible” that Turkey would refuse to co‑operate. Constitutionally the Turkish Parliament

had to give its consent, and the constitution stated that it could only do so in the context

of international legitimacy.

On 10 and 11 October, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a joint

resolution authorising the use of military force against Iraq.320

Signing the joint resolution on 16 October, President Bush stated that it symbolised the

united purpose of the nation and expressed the considered judgement of Congress.321

Congress had authorised the use of force but he had not ordered that use, and he hoped

that would not become necessary.

More detail is provided in Section 3.5.

814. Mr Blair concluded that, while he wanted to keep the option of Package 3

open, the UK must not commit itself at that stage.

815. Mr Blair, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon met on 17 October to discuss the latest

developments on the UN negotiations and the military options.322 Adm Boyce, Mr Powell,

Mr Campbell, Baroness Morgan, Sir David Manning and Mr Rycroft were also present.

816. Mr Rycroft recorded that Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce had “set out the options, as

in the Defence Secretary’s minute” of 15 October. Adm Boyce had “put the military

arguments for agreeing to Package 3. But if we were to end up agreeing on Package 2,

it would be better to tell the US now”. Mr Straw had said “that the international case for

Package 3 was strong”.

817. Mr Blair “took these points” but:

“… remained concerned about the costs. He concluded that he wanted to keep open

the option of Package 3. But we must not commit to it at this stage.”

319 Teleletter Westmacott to Oakden, 16 October 2002, ‘Possible Military Action Against Iraq:

Turkish Policy’.

320 Almanac of Policy Issues, 15 October 2002, Congressional Resolution Authorizing Force Against Iraq.

321 The White House, 16 October 2002, President Signs Iraq Resolution.

322 Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military Options’.

300