The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Do not see
Basra as being of strategic significance;
•
Do not
believe the fall of Basra would in itself improve the prospects for
the
fall of
Baghdad;
•
Judge the
main priorities for 1 (UK) Div as being the maintenance of
control
over the
southern oilfields, the security of the lines of communication and
the
retention
of Umm Qasr;
•
Would not
currently be prepared to provide additional forces for
operations
to secure
entry into Basra; and
•
Are
unlikely to review their position until after the planned major
engagement
with
Republican Guard forces, which may not take place for several
days.”
305.
Mr Johnson
added that 1 (UK) Div was implementing “a proactive
strategy
to develop
Coalition control over Basra … conditioned by the need to avoid
large
UK or
civilian casualties”. Iraq was thought to be reinforcing Basra.
Progress would
be “determined
by effects and events rather than a set timetable”. There
was
“no indication
that the US are contemplating any change in strategy”.
306.
In the
detailed portion of his advice, Mr Johnson stated that US
commanders
did not
see the fall of Basra as “a high operational
priority”.
307.
The “security
of the line of communication – under continual attack from
Iraqi
irregulars
– and the associated preparation of … front line forces … the key
enablers
for the
launch of decisive operations against Republican Guard forces, and
thereafter
Baghdad”
were Lt Gen McKiernan’s priorities.
308.
The US also
did not see Basra as “the main effort for British
Forces.
They
attach a
higher priority to the continued security of the southern
oilfields, their lines
of communication,
and to the retention of Umm Qasr.”
309.
In relation to
the UK’s strategy for Basra, Maj Gen Brims was “continuing
with
constant,
aggressive activity in and around Basra”. His aims were
to:
•
“divide the
Iraqi irregulars from the regime in Baghdad and the civilian
population
in Basra
and az-Zubayr …
•
“encourage
any popular uprisings that might enable British forces to enter
and
take
control of the cities, with acceptable risk.”
310.
Maj Gen Brims
had assessed that:
“… even if
he wanted to at this stage – it would be extremely difficult and
highly risky
to attempt
to enter Basra whilst the irregulars remained well organised and
while
the
population are only supporting the Coalition passively at best. To
compensate
for these
factors he would have to resort to attritional tactics relying on
heavy
firepower.
This would guarantee significant casualties – both British and
civilians –
and
widespread damage to infrastructure, both of which could only have
a negative
impact on
domestic and international support, and on Iraqi perceptions of the
UK
52