The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
418.
In a meeting
overseas in early January, SIS1 told Mr Blair that the body
of
available
evidence was “highly damning” but “none of the reports could yet be
termed
a silver
bullet”.148
Mr Blair
had been “surprised and pleased” that so much had been
accumulated,
but he needed some more evidence that Saddam Hussein was in
breach
(of
resolution 1441), which he (Mr Blair) could use as the basis
for personal assurances
to Cabinet,
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), and to key allies such as
President
Chirac and
President Bush and regional leaders. As a result, SIS1 recorded
that
Mr Blair
had asked for a “stocktake”, including an assessment of the
likelihood that the
UNMOVIC
process would produce that kind of evidence.
419.
On 4 January,
Mr Blair sent a long note to officials in
No.10.149
420.
On Iraq,
Mr Blair stated:
“We start
from behind. People suspect US motives; don’t accept Saddam is a
threat;
worry it
will make us a target. Yet the truth is removing Saddam is right;
he is a
threat; and
WMD has to be countered. So there is a big job of persuasion. We
need
the
following in place:
(i) most
obviously, the evidence of breach of the UN resolution
leading
hopefully
to a new resolution. Time is short. We need either evidence
of
actual WMD;
or documentation concealed; or an eye witness account
of the
programme. We are making efforts on all three. But one or
more
needs to be
in place. [...] our biggest hindrance, is the
intimidation
Saddam is
exercising. Those who might co‑operate are being told
very
clearly their families will die. So even though we all know
the
declaration …
is a lie, proving the lie will be hard. I need an early
meeting
on this
with C.
(ii) We
need to set out the WMD case generally; publish evidence of it;
and
have some
high profile interdiction of WMD material. People just
totally
underestimate
the WMD threat.
(iii) We
need to link WMD and terrorism. The truth is the two coming
together,
is only a
matter of time. But people need to understand that if we
don’t
act, the
world will be more unsafe.
(iv) We
need to prepare a very clear statement of guarantees for the
Iraqi
people,
setting out territorial integrity etc; and I assume without
Saddam
we could
lift sanctions.
(v) We need
to work out the post‑Saddam scenario. Are we going to
identify
him, and
his close associates only, as fit for removal, in the hope of
having
the regime
crumble; or are we going to be more forward. By
instinct,
I favour
making it clear: removing Saddam is the immediate task;
the
148
Private
hearing, SIS1, Part I, pages 60‑61.
149
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 4 January 2003, [extract
‘Iraq’].
76