15.1 | Civilian
personnel
•
pursuing a
commercial contract for the security manager and armed
escorts;
•
factoring
additional costs into the Iraq Reserve claim; and
•
agreeing
with the IPU a script for briefing all UK secondees before
they
deployed.
135.
Mr Millett
described the situation in Basra as “different from Baghdad,
partly
because of
the political context in the South and partly because UK civilians
are not
accompanied
by military patrols”. The atmosphere was “more benign”, but
could
deteriorate.
Security in Basra was enhanced by “the active involvement of a DFID
team
and a
commercial contract that will provide armed guards and more
vehicles”.
136.
Mr Collecott
advised Mr Straw:
“We will
inevitably be faced with some very difficult prioritisation
decisions: activity
v. security
in Iraq; activity in Iraq v. priorities
elsewhere.” 88
137.
Mr Chakrabarti
had already set in hand the first of the recommended
improvements.
On 9 July, he informed Sir Michael Jay that he had appointed
Control
Risks Group
(CRG) to provide armed support to UK CPA secondees in
Baghdad.89
The
contract had been let by DFID, in consultation with the FCO, with
the intention of
drawing up
a joint DFID/FCO contract for the longer term. Mr Chakrabarti
also undertook
to send a
first batch of “appropriate vehicles” and hand‑held communications
equipment
from DFID’s
stockpile for use by UK staff in Iraq.
138.
In late June,
DFID asked the MOD to provide a military close protection team
for
139.
It its
response on 17 July, the MOD explained that Royal Military Police
(RMP)
close
protection resources were “very heavily committed … in support of
the FCO
presence in
Baghdad and on other tasks elsewhere”. Steps had been taken to
bring the
RMP
commitment down to sustainable levels. That included a reduction in
RMP support
for FCO
staff, which would limit their freedom of movement in Baghdad. MOD
Ministers
had agreed
that the only way the RMP could provide resources to DFID staff
would be
if DFID
shared the resources available to the FCO:
“We
recognise that this is far from ideal for you and is likely to
further constrain
HMG’s [Her
Majesty’s Government’s] diplomatic activity in Baghdad, but it may
be
an
improvement on your current arrangements.”
140.
Separately,
the MOD informed DFID that medical procedures were being
updated
to ensure
that all UK civilians and contractors received the same standard of
care
as those
in the MOD, including evacuation to the UK or Germany as
appropriate.91
88
Minute
Collecott, 11 July 2003, on Minute Millett to PS [FCO], 11 July
2003, ‘Iraq: Security’.
89
Letter
Chakrabarti to Jay, 9 July 2003, ‘Safety and Security of UK
Secondees in Iraq’.
90
Letter
Kernahan to Miller, 17 July 2003, ‘Close Protection for DFID Staff
in Baghdad’.
91
Letter
Ferguson to DFID [junior official], 17 July 2003, ‘DFID Personnel
Deployed in Iraq’.
267