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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
112.  The minute began:
“You ask how alarmed you should be about Iraq. Of course we should be
concerned – about the continuing high level of violence; lack of grip of the
ITG; slow pace of reconstruction etc. It is difficult to see these things being
remedied quickly.
“At the same time we need to make a hard-headed calculation: are we headed for
strategic failure? I do not think we are, principally because the political process
remains on track and, so far, the insurgents have not succeeded in fomenting any
widespread sectarian conflict. Those are the bottom line strategic risks.”
113.  Sir Nigel suggested that the objective over the next six months should be:
“… to build the right political and security platform so that:
the elected Iraqi Government after the December elections can really take
charge and govern the country; and
the MNF can begin a substantial withdrawal next year, and leave the country
in the hands of the ISF, without precipitating a civil war. At present there is no
doubt that the presence of the MNF contains the sectarian violence.”
114.  Achieving the objective required “a comprehensive political strategy”. Sir Nigel
suggested that the FCO paper discussed at DOP(I) contained all the necessary
elements of such a strategy. One of the key requirements was:
“A delivery mechanism: close co-ordination between the UK and US Ambassadors
and military in Baghdad; Jack [Straw] and Condi [Rice] in charge of the political
process; John [Reid] and Rumsfeld engaged on the security strategy.”
115.  Attached to Sir Nigel’s advice was a draft note for Mr Blair to send to President
Bush, prepared by Mr Blair’s Private Secretary.54 It emphasised “if we are going
to achieve decisive effect within the necessary timescale, we need clearer lines of
responsibility for managing delivery”.
116.  Mr Blair wrote in manuscript on Sir Nigel’s advice: “I agree strongly with your
analysis. My concern is delivering the strategy.”55
54  Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 22 July 2005, ‘Iraq: A Comprehensive Strategy’ attaching ‘Note for
President Bush, Iraq: A Comprehensive Political Strategy’.
55  Manuscript comment Blair to Sheinwald on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 22 July 2005,
‘Iraq: A Comprehensive Strategy’.
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