The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
CPA
finances. What were the obstacles to funding? If there were delays,
the UK
should be
prepared to finance new operations in the South itself, in advance
of
CPA
funding.
•
Oil and
electricity. How could progress be accelerated, and how could
UK
industry be
more involved?
678.
In August, the
UK reviewed its force levels in Iraq in the light of the
deteriorating
security
situation (see Section 9.2).
679.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Rycroft on 4 September to report
that:
“… in the
light of the changing security situation in the South East of Iraq,
and in
view of
likely next steps by the CPA, the Defence Secretary had concluded
that
there is an
immediate requirement to deploy a further two infantry battalions
and
certain
specialist capabilities to Iraq. Furthermore, we intend to identify
and put on
reduced
notice to move a Brigade HQ, Infantry battalion and engineer
capability
as a
contingency to support the implementation of the CPA(S) plan for
emergency
infrastructure
work due to be delivered by Sir Hilary …”378
680.
The Essential
Services Plan was submitted to the AHMGIR on 4 September,
with
an
implementation plan promised for the following
week.379
681.
The Plan
stated that CPA(South)’s intent was to improve essential
services
over the
short, medium and long term as part of the “overall CPA
reconstruction
strategy”.380
However,
“the imperative of securing rapid and visible improvements …
and
forestalling
erosion of Iraqi consent demands the urgent implementation of a
short-term
emergency
plan”.
•
increase
power supply, including by improving management,
repairing
transmission
and distribution systems, providing generators, and
providing
spares and
equipment;
•
increase
fuel supply, including by improving and constructing new
fuel
distribution
and storage facilities, and improving gas distribution facilities;
and
•
increase
water supply, including by improving maintenance and refurbishing
and
improving
power supply to key water treatment plants.
683.
The Plan was
costed at US$127m, comprising US$90.5m for work to
improve the
power supply, US$12m for fuel supply, US$23m for water supply
and
US$1.25m
for general programme support. Funds were to be provided by the
CPA,
DFID or
other sources.
378
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Forces and
Resources Review’.
379 Annotated
Agenda, 4 September 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
380
Paper
[unattributed], 2 September 2003, ‘Annex B: Strategy for the
Essential Services in Southern Iraq’.
118