The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… we could
afford to take the decision quite late. It wasn’t starting with a
fresh plan
in the
middle of January. The southern plan was pretty well developed, in
fact almost
entirely
developed, by then.”357
645.
Asked about
the impact of the reduction in preparation time, Lord Boyce
stated:
“… it meant
everything was being done at a rush … some aspects of the
full
operational
capability weren’t achieved until literally the nth hour … I don’t
believe …
that our
capability at the end of the day was in any sense seriously
degraded … but
nonetheless
it did make it a tight run thing.”358
646.
Describing the
thinking which had led to the UK’s original offer in Package 3
in
October of
a brigade and divisional headquarters, Lord Boyce stated that it
was “not a
huge move
then … into a division minus, which is what we actually finished up
with”.359
647.
Asked whether,
when he had visited UK forces just before the start of
operations,
he had been
given any indications that they were lacking equipment such as
body
armour and
ammunition, Lord Boyce replied: “No”. But he added that he had
been
concerned
about the “ability to cope with any biological or chemical threat”,
and at
the time
of his visit, a “very small percentage” of the force had not had
their gas
masks checked.
648.
The
achievements of the MOD and the Armed Forces in preparing
the
forces
deployed for combat operations in Iraq against tight deadlines
were
very considerable.
649.
But the
evidence set out in this Section of the Report demonstrates
that
significant
risks were taken as a result of decisions made in mid-January
to
deploy a
larger combat force in a very compressed timescale. The
difficulties were
exacerbated
by the absence of systems which could accurately track and
report
the
situation on the ground.
650.
The
provision of additional funding from the Reserve for UORs worked
well
and there
is no evidence of any delay or obstruction on the part of the
Treasury.
651.
A number of
witnesses to the Inquiry stated, or implied, that the
serious
shortfalls
of some equipment could have been mitigated if permission to
discuss
procurement
with industry had been given earlier.
652.
That claim
is impossible to determine. It is clear that the restrictions
on
discussions
with industry before 15 October did hinder planning and
preparations
and cause
anxiety.
357
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 17-18.
358
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 28.
359
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 30.
106