9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
•
emphasising
to the Sadrists that a choice finally had to be made
between
building
state institutions and pursuing factional influence through
criminality;
•
continuing
to underline with political contacts the importance of
supporting
Prime Minister
Maliki; and
•
persuading
the US to temper their public message to avoid giving fuel to
the
Sadrists’
public accusations that Prime Minister Maliki was a US
lackey.
908.
Mr Prentice
concluded:
“Despite
the fevered talk … that the State is in peril, state institutions
are not about
to
disappear, even in the worst case. We are not about to see JAM in
the palace …
“The
political deal in Basra will be a precedent for the rest of the
South. Whatever
the scale
of concessions to JAM inherent in the eventual political
compromise
reached in
Basra with the Sadrists, it will set the standard for handling the
JAM
challenge
in other provinces. The wider public will also draw lessons about
the
risk of
standing out locally against the militia … Our aim must be to
settle the
country
back into the recent slow grind of normal Iraqi politics. Some of
the new
dynamics
released by events in Basra may in the end prove positive and help
to
build
on recent political progress. But, immediately, there are
still serious challenges
in Basra.”
909.
On the evening
of 31 March, Mr Brown’s Private Secretary told him
that:
“The US
agree that the most likely outcome in Basra is stalemate. The Iraqi
Security
Forces
can’t muster what is needed for a clear and hold operation. Maliki
will be
910.
The same
Private Secretary also reported that Muqtada al-Sadr had made
a
further
statement calling for an end to arrests, detainee releases, a
pardon for JAM
members,
the punishment of those responsible for the death of Sadrists and
for Prime
Minister
Maliki to leave Basra province. He added:
“Given the
improvement on the ground, it may make most sense to focus
tomorrow’s
meeting on
the longer term strategy, while drawing lessons from the last few
days …”
911.
In his second
weekly report as SBMR-I, Lt Gen Cooper reflected on the impact
that
the recent
events in Basra had had on key relationships within
Iraq.449
“The US’s
relationship with Maliki has been damaged … because of the
surprise
nature of
the expedition …
“US-UK
relationships are polite but bruised. Suspicions about the
Accommodation
with JAM in
Basra are not far below the surface. Those that were part of
the
448
Email
Fletcher to Brown, 31 March 2008, ‘Iraq Update’.
449
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 31 March 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (294) 31 Mar
08’.
349