6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
plan to
manage early provision of humanitarian assistance, but “a distinct
lack of
planning by
the US” on local and national civil administration:
“An initial
plan to divide the country in two (largely arbitrary) parts, with
Baghdad as
a third
entity, may not last the test of time … Garner has now seen the
CFLCC ‘7
sectors’
map and appears attracted to mirroring those for civil
administration – but
there is
still no concept of how to interact with either current Iraqi civil
governance
structures
… or the military divisions. This might be an area where [the] UK
can
provide
some useful guidance.”
683.
The paper
listed several UK concerns:
•
“Humanitarian
Assistance/Stability Provision.” The UK plan was “to
make
most use of
the US humanitarian provision”, but DFID and the UK military
had
concerns
about the level of practical US support that would be available
and
the likely
initial absence of NGOs and international organisations. Because
of
the block
on the deployment of DFID advisers to Kuwait, UK military planning
to
cover the
gap was going ahead without guidance. The absence of funding
was
even more
pressing.
•
“Roll-out
of regional administration.” ORHA had still not thought through
the
detail of
how it would administer Iraq. There was a risk of giving the
impression
of a
military occupation.
•
“Military
lay-down.” It was “absolutely clear” that, of the seven military
sectors,
the US
expected the UK to take leadership of the South-East. Without
Coalition
partners
that would be beyond UK capabilities in the “medium term”. The
UK
was
“currently
at risk of taking on a very substantial commitment that
we
will have
great difficulty in sustaining beyond the immediate conclusion
of
conflict”.
•
“Policy
lacunae.” There were still many unresolved details in US
planning.
The UK
was seeking to influence US thinking, but US decision-making
was
moving so
fast that “UK policy will have largely to be about managing
the
consequences
of US decisions that are taken for us”.
•
“Funding.”
This remained “a great unknown”. US planning assumed the
rest
of the
world would pick up 75 percent of the bill for reconstruction. That
was
“possibly
hopelessly optimistic”. As an Occupying Power, the UK would be at
the
front of
the queue of countries the US would approach to make up any
deficit.
684.
Mr Cannon
commented: “Prime Minister and Jonathan Powell should
see.”301
685.
Some of the
issues raised in Mr Hoon’s letter were discussed at
Mr Blair’s meeting
on
post-conflict issues on 6 March.
301
Manuscript
comment Cannon, 28 February 2003, on Letter Williams to Manning, 28
February 2003,
‘Iraq:
Military Planning and Preparation’ attaching Paper [unattributed],
28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning
Update – 28 February 2003’.
433