The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
397.
Sir Suma
Chakrabarti told the Inquiry that Ms Short’s resignation, the
exchanges
within the
UK Government that had preceded it, and the adoption of resolution
1483 led
to a
significant shift in DFID’s attitude to ORHA:
“… we
[DFID] didn’t think ORHA would be actually the lead in terms of
post-conflict
work. We
thought the UN would take that role on. The UN was geared up to do
so,
putting
more staff into Iraq at the time …
“The penny
dropped that … ORHA was going to be the only game in town
when
1483 was
passed. It probably dropped actually with Clare Short’s
resignation
… because
it was at that point we realised that perhaps there wasn’t a
shared
objective
on UN leadership in the British Government because the Prime
Minister’s
conversation
with Clare Short made that clear. From that point on, we had to try
and
make ORHA
work better whether we liked it or not.”223
398.
Mr Blair
visited Basra and Umm Qasr on 29 May. DFID, the FCO and the
MOD
provided
separate briefings for the visit.
399.
DFID advised
that the humanitarian situation was improving steadily,
although
security
remained a key concern.224
Without
security, it would be difficult to achieve
progress in
other areas. In many parts of Iraq, water and power services were
“almost at
pre-conflict
levels”. Looking ahead, rebuilding Iraqi public institutions would
be the main
challenge.
ORHA had a central role to play; DFID had stepped up its “staff
support” for
ORHA in
Baghdad and Basra and was looking at additional areas to
support.
400.
The FCO
advised that Ambassador Bremer’s arrival had yet to translate
into
improvements
on the ground.225
The UK now
had 61 secondees in ORHA (including in
Basra),
most of whom were working with Iraqi ministries.
401.
Success in
ORHA(South) was “crucial to achieving UK national objectives in
Iraq”.
The UK had
provided a Deputy to Ambassador Olsen and 10 other secondees,
and
planned to
further reinforce ORHA(South) by:
•
providing
more secondees;
•
providing
an operational plan compatible with ORHA’s national plan;
and
•
encouraging
ORHA(Baghdad) to accelerate reconstruction efforts by
delegating
more of its
budget to regional offices.
223
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 34.
224
Letter
Bewes to Cannon, [undated], ‘Iraq – Humanitarian
Update’.
225
Letter
Sinclair to Cannon, 27 May 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to
Iraq’.
72