9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
117.
Mr Rycroft had
opened the talks by describing common ground between the
UK
and the US,
including the principle that the UN should have a role and that a
further
resolution
would be sought. It was too early to discuss negotiating
tactics.
118.
Mr Cannon
reported that the US delegation had said that a resolution
was
politically
and diplomatically useful and legally beneficial, but not
absolutely necessary.
The US
delegation was clear that it did not want the UN’s role to include
being in charge
of
establishing the IIA.
119.
UK officials
explained that, without a resolution, they had legal difficulties
with
making
changes to Iraqi institutions; the US legal interpretation was
different.
120.
The US
delegation proposed that Iraqi oil revenues should be under
the
supervision
of ORHA (if necessary with a “double-signature” arrangement with
the IIA).
Treasury
officials in the US delegation said that the UN should not
manage
Iraq’s
budget.
121.
Mr Cannon
reported that on balance UK officials found the US
approach
reassuring;
although there were policy differences in a number of important
areas, there
were also
signs of flexibility.
122.
On 4 April, Mr
Rycroft wrote an account of the talks for Mr Blair in which he
judged:
“There
remain differences between us and much still to do, but it was
moderately
encouraging.”56
The main
differences between the US and UK were:
•
the legal
interpretation of how much the Coalition could do, through
ORHA,
as an
Occupying Power;
•
how to set
up the IIA;
•
the UN’s
relationship with the IIA; and
•
negotiating
tactics – the US preferred to “aim high at this stage and
water
down our
text only later”.
123.
Mr Straw told
the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 4 April that he felt renewed
optimism
about
achieving a UN framework for Phase IV activity in Iraq, following a
meeting of
NATO and EU
Foreign Ministers:
“He had
registered with these colleagues that domestic politics and
expectations
had been
changed by the fact of having British troops in Iraq. The reality
was that
the
Coalition would have to retain some control in the wake of
conflict, but the United
Nations
should also be involved.”57
56
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 4 April 2003, ‘Future of
Iraq’.
57
Minutes, 4
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
151