The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the
possible collusion or acquiescence of the Iraqi Police
Service.120
As a
result, General
Mohan had
deployed his entire reserve battalion to the site. For this reason,
and the late
arrival of
some equipment, the withdrawal from Basra Palace had been
delayed.
264.
Mr McDonald
asked whether a delay would be likely to have any negative
impact
on the JAM
cease-fire. The FCO felt that the risk was low and that there were
“some
indications”
though no guarantee that Basra Palace would not be
targeted.
265.
US officials
in Baghdad had established a working group to discuss
arrangements
for the
renewal of the UN Security Council resolution which provided the
MNF with its
mandate in
Iraq. Mr Nigel Casey reported to the Iraq Strategy Group that
engagement
with UK
officials “to agree a joint strategy for handling the Iraqis” would
begin after
Gen Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker had given evidence to Congress.
266.
Reflecting on
the events that occurred after the UK had vacated the
PJCC,
Maj Gen
Binns wrote:
“Whilst the
events that unfolded within the PJCC after we vacated were
unfortunate,
there is
much good that can be taken from them. Mohan quickly got to grips
with the
situation …
regaining control of the building … The fact that the PJCC shift
was back
in the next
morning … is testimony to an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem and
bodes
well for
the future … I for one see the positives that came out of these
events.”121
267.
On 30 August,
a government official working closely with the military
reported
that he had
sent a copy of the letter on Basra Palace to colleagues in
Whitehall.122
He recorded
the “excellent news” that Mr Ingram had signed off the MOD’s
advice.
268.
A paper by the
Assessments Staff on 30 August stated that an announcement
that
JAM would
be “restructured” was “almost certainly prompted by the growing
frustration
of Muqtada
al-Sadr and other senior Sadrist leaders over their lack of control
over
269.
The
Assessments Staff also considered that what was meant by “freezing”
JAM
activity
was unclear and recorded that they doubted the ability of the
Sadrist leadership
to deliver
a cease-fire.
270.
Lt Gen Rollo
told the Inquiry that JAM had “overplayed their hand” in August,
in
the area
immediately south of Baghdad, by assassinating several chiefs of
police and
governors.124
This led to
a “fairly major push against them” by the ISF, which put
them
under
pressure, resulting in the cease-fire.
120
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 30 August 2007, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 29 August’.
121
Minute
Binns to CJO, 30 August 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update – 30 August 2007’.
122
Minute
official working closely with the military, 30 August 2007, ‘[NAME
OF OPERATION] Update
to Whitehall’.
123
Paper
Assessments Staff, 30 August 2007, ‘Iraq: JAM Restructuring and
Ceasefires’.
124
Public
Hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 71-72.
232